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A Bismarckian Moment:
Charkaoui and Bill C-3
Craig Forcese and Lorne Waldman*

I. INTRODUCTION
The German statesman Otto von Bismarck once said that “[i]f you
like laws and sausages, you should never watch either one being made.”1
The recent enactment of Bill C-32 — the government’s response to the
Supreme Court’s February 2007 decision in Charkaoui v. Canada
(Citizenship and Immigration)3 — can best be described as a
“Bismarckian moment”. An effort to remedy the core defects of the prior
immigration security certificate regime, the new law cobbles together a
potentially half-hearted “special advocate” regime and converts
immigration law into a de facto system of indefinite limits on liberty for
foreigners. The new system will generate an inevitable series of new
constitutional challenges, some of which may succeed at the Supreme
Court unless the deficiencies of Bill C-3 are cured by careful innovation
at the Federal Court level.
As discussed more fully in Kent Roach’s article in this volume, 4 this
Bill C-3 experience prompts observations about the true workings of the
“dialogue” between courts and political branches on matters of
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assistance on this article. Craig Forcese would also like to thank the Social Science Humanities
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1
Suzy Platt, ed., Respectfully Quoted: A Dictionary of Quotations (Washington D.C.:
Library of Congress, 1989), online: <http://www.bartleby.com/73/996.html>.
2
An Act to amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (certificate and special
advocate), S.C. 2008, c. 3.
3
[2007] S.C.J. No. 9, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350 (S.C.C.).
4
Kent Roach, “Charkaoui and Bill C-3: Some Implications for Anti-Terrorism Policy and
Dialogue between Courts and Legislatures” (2008) 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) 281.
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constitutional law,5 a concept espoused in the case law most famously in
Vriend v. Alberta.6 In Vriend, the Court observed that:
In reviewing legislative enactments and executive decisions to ensure
constitutional validity, the courts speak to the legislative and executive
branches. As has been pointed out, most of the legislation held not to
pass constitutional muster has been followed by new legislation
designed to accomplish similar objectives. … By doing this, the
legislature responds to the courts; hence the dialogue among the
branches.7

In principle, the result is greater accountability because the work of each
branch is reviewed by the other. This dialogue and enhanced
accountability “have the effect of enhancing the democratic process, not
denying it”.8
Critics have sometimes rejected this assessment. They envisage the
so-called dialogue between courts and legislatures as a monologue
because judicial opinions give political credence to one policy position
on an issue, lending the advantages of political inertia to that group.
After courts have spoken, polarized political institutions find it easier to
abdicate responsibility than to step to the plate again.9
The Bill C-3 experience reflects a more nuanced dialogue than this
critique implies. The Supreme Court’s reasoning did colour the response
of the political branches of government, but not in the deterministic way
envisaged by the dialogue theory critique. Charkaoui presented a menu
of alternatives, not a fixed road-map leading inexorably to one
conclusion. However, political actors construed these options in manners
that suited their political needs or preferences, occasionally deploying
the time limits imposed by that decision to negate dissent or to create a
climate of crisis. The result is a law that while reacting to Charkaoui is
best described as minimally responsive; that is, it creates a reformed
system that does as little as possible (and perhaps too little) to respond to
the constitutional complaint animating critiques of the prior regime.
Along the way, it undertakes selective revisions of the security
certificate regime that set up a next generation of constitutional
5
For the exploration of a “dialogue” theory, see, most notably, Peter Hogg & Allison
Bushell, “The Charter Dialogue between Courts and Legislatures” (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall L.J. 75.
6
[1998] S.C.J. No. 29, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493 (S.C.C.).
7
Id., at 565.
8
Id., at 566.
9
F.L. Morton, “Dialogue or Monologue”, in Paul Howe & Peter Russell, eds., Judicial
Power and Canadian Democracy (Kingston, ON: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2001).
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challenges. Bill C-3 is, in other words, an awkward political concoction
that risks new constitutional “train-wrecks” while only nominally
cleaning up the last one.
The article that follows explores these contentions. Unusually for an
academic paper, it begins with a disclosure. One of the authors was
involved in Charkaoui as counsel for an intervenor. Both authors then
co-wrote a study on comparative “special advocate” models10 and, on
that basis, were actively involved in the legislative process surrounding
Bill C-3 as witnesses before parliamentary committees, and through
discussions with parliamentarians and parliamentary staff and officials in
the executive branch of government. One of us has now been named a
special advocate, and both of us remain involved in one capacity or
another in the development of the special advocate process. Put another
way, we have been analysts, witnesses and protagonists in respect to the
matters addressed in this article. In this paper, we assess the outcome of
the Bill C-3 experience through an academic lens in order to provide an
unofficial “legislative history” of this law-project. The manner in which
we proceed is, however, inevitably affected by (and reflects) our
proximity to the law-making process.
We undertake this project in four core sections. Part II of this article
provides a brief overview of the immigration security certificate regime
and the core Charkaoui holding on the question of fair hearings. Part III
canvasses the various models of “special counsel” the Supreme Court
suggested might satisfy constitutional requirements under section 1 of
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.11 Part IV examines the
policy and political environment in which Bill C-3 was then developed,
the nature of Bill C-3’s response to the core findings of the Charkaoui
decision and the law-making process in Parliament. Part V then turns to
other features of Bill C-3, noting both changes that will likely prove
important and other areas that will likely create new controversies.
The article concludes that Bill C-3 represents an unsatisfactory
waypoint in — rather than an ultimate culmination of — protracted
constitutional debates over security certificates.
10

Craig Forcese & Lorne Waldman, Seeking Justice in an Unfair Process: Lessons from
Canada, the United Kingdom, and New Zealand on the Use of “Special Advocates” in National
Security Proceedings (Study commissioned by the Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security
Studies, with the financial support of the Courts Administration Service) (August 2007), online:
<http://aix1.uottawa.ca/~cforcese/other/sastudy.pdf> [hereinafter “Seeking Justice”].
11
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.)
1982, c. 11.

358

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2008), 42 S.C.L.R. (2d)

II. SECURITY CERTIFICATES AND THE CHARKAOUI DECISION
1. Security Certificates in Brief
Under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act,12 the Federal
Court of Canada reviews “security certificates” issued by the Minister of
Immigration and the Minister of Public Safety. These certificates are
linked to the detention and, where adjudged reasonable by a Federal
Court judge, the potential removal of a named person.13 Where the
security concerns are grave enough, IRPA purports to authorize the
removal of the named person even if he or she is at risk of torture or
other maltreatment in the receiving state, after the government balances
the risk to the named person against the risk the person poses to
Canada’s national security.14 In the Federal Court proceeding, the person
subject to the certificate receives only a summary of the secret
information produced by the government in support of the certificate.
As the section that follows describes, the resulting inability of the
named person to know the case to be met and contest the government’s
allegations has fuelled substantial controversy in and outside of the
courtroom, and ultimately sparked the Charkaoui decision of the
Supreme Court of Canada.
2. The Opportunity to Meet the Case and Security Certificates
(a) Practice in the Federal Court
In March 2002, Hugessen J. of the Federal Court publicly
complained that the IRPA security certificate procedures make judges “a
little bit like a fig leaf”.
We do not like this process of having to sit alone hearing only one
party and looking at the materials produced by only one party and
having to try to figure out for ourselves what is wrong with the case
that is being presented before us and having to try for ourselves to see
how the witnesses that appear before us ought to be cross-examined …
We greatly miss, in short, our security blanket which is the adversary
system that we were all brought up with and that … is for most of us,

12
13
14

S.C. 2001, c. 27 [hereinafter “IRPA”].
By “named person”, this article means the person subject to the security certificate.
See discussion on this point below in Part IV.
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the real warranty that the outcome of what we do is going to be fair and
just.

He proposed “some sort of system somewhat like the public defender
system where some lawyers were mandated to have full access to the
CSIS files, the underlying files, and to present whatever case they could
against the granting of the relief sought”.15
Justice Hugessen’s views did not, however, affect the jurisprudence
of the Federal Court on full answer and defence in security certificate
proceedings. For instance, the Federal Court of Appeal, in the Charkaoui
case, was sympathetic to the difficulties the IRPA ex parte process
produces, noting “[t]here is no doubt that the system, as it exists,
complicates the task of the designated judge who must, in the absence of
an applicant and his counsel, concern himself with the latter’s interests
in order to give equal treatment to the parties before him”.16 Yet, the
Court of Appeal held that it was for Parliament to set up such a system,
not for the courts to demand it as part of minimal constitutional
guarantees.17 Similar views had been expressed by the Federal Court in
other IRPA national security certificate cases.18 Up until 2007, the
Federal Court had addressed concerns about the ex parte nature of
proceedings by adopting a pseudo-inquisitorial style in an effort to probe
the government evidence.19
(b) The Charkaoui Decision of the Supreme Court of Canada
The Supreme Court in Charkaoui took a very different approach,
concluding that this Federal Court’s effort to resuscitate something
approximating an adversarial system was inadequate.20 In a passage
15

Justice Hugessen, at a March 2002 conference held at the Canadian Institute for the
Administration of Justice entitled “Terrorism, Law and Democracy”, reproduced in James K.
Hugessen, “Watching the Watchers: Democratic Oversight” in D. Daubney et. al., eds., Terrorism,
Law and Democracy: How is Canada changing following September 11? (Montreal: Canadian
Institute for the Administration of Justice, 2002) 381, at 384.
16
Re Charkaoui, [2004] F.C.J. No. 2060, 2004 FCA 421, at para. 124 (F.C.A.).
17
Id., at paras. 121-26.
18
Re Harkat, [2004] F.C.J. No. 2101, 2004 FC 1717, at para. 43 et seq. (F.C.); Mahjoub v.
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2005] F.C.J. No. 173, 2005 FC 156, at para. 62
(F.C.).
19
See Re Harkat, [2005] F.C.J. No. 481, 2005 FC 393, at para. 93 et seq.
20
Charkaoui, supra, note 3, at para. 51 (“The judge is not afforded the power to
independently investigate all relevant facts that true inquisitorial judges enjoy. At the same time,
since the named person is not given a full picture of the case to meet, the judge cannot rely on the
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worthy of citation in full, the Court noted the deficiencies of the IRPA
system:
The judge, working under the constraints imposed by the IRPA, simply
cannot fill the vacuum left by the removal of the traditional guarantees
of a fair hearing. The judge sees only what the ministers put before him
or her. The judge, knowing nothing else about the case, is not in a
position to identify errors, find omissions or assess the credibility and
truthfulness of the information in the way the named person would be.
Although the judge may ask questions of the named person when the
hearing is reopened, the judge is prevented from asking questions that
might disclose the protected information. Likewise, since the named
person does not know what has been put against him or her, he or she
does not know what the designated judge needs to hear. If the judge
cannot provide the named person with a summary of the information
that is sufficient to enable the person to know the case to meet, then the
judge cannot be satisfied that the information before him or her is
sufficient or reliable. Despite the judge’s best efforts to question the
government’s witnesses and scrutinize the documentary evidence, he
or she is placed in the situation of asking questions and ultimately
deciding the issues on the basis of incomplete and potentially
unreliable information.21

For these reasons, the IRPA secrecy rules violated section 7. They also
violated section 1; the government had shown no reason why it had
failed to adopt some sort of model in which an independent “special
counsel” represented the interests of named person in the ex parte
proceedings. In the absence of such a counsel, the security certificate
system could not be viewed as minimally impairing of the section 7
right.

III. A MENU OF MINIMALLY IMPAIRING ALTERNATIVES
This holding on special counsel constituted the single most
important finding of the Court, one that would inform most of what
followed in Bill C-3. It is important, therefore, to review closely the
Supreme Court’s deliberations on this issue.
Critically, in the course of its decision, the Court canvassed a
number of different special counsel options, but without expressing a
parties to present missing evidence. The result is that, at the end of the day, one cannot be sure that
the judge has been exposed to the whole factual picture”).
21
Id., at para. 63.
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preference between these alternatives. Indeed, it expressly left it to
Parliament to decide “what more should be done”.22 These alternatives
were (in the order in which they appeared): the Security Intelligence
Review Committee (“SIRC”) process; the Air India trial process; the
Arar Commission process; and the United Kingdom system of special
advocates. It also discussed the approach taken by the Canada Evidence
Act23 in the disclosure of information said to raise national security
issues. This Part examines the SIRC and U.K. approaches, the two
models with a standing, institutional structure.24
Our discussion of the SIRC and U.K. approaches includes
information drawn both from published material, duly cited. In other
instances, however, our information is from primary sources; that is,
drawn from a series of interviews conducted in the summer of 2007 with
Canadian and U.K. barristers involved in the SIRC and special advocate
systems.25
1. Security Intelligence Review Committee
SIRC is a body of often prominent individuals appointed by the
Governor-in-Council (after consultation with the leaders of official
parties in the Commons) to review the Canadian Security and
Intelligence Service (“CSIS”), Canada’s security intelligence agency.26
In performing its functions, SIRC has two roles: to review the activities
of CSIS and to investigate complaints against CSIS. In relation to the
latter function, the most generic complaint concerns “any act or thing
done by the Service”.27
22

Id., at para. 87.
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5.
24
For an excellent discussion of, inter alia, the Air India trial and Arar Commission
approach, see Roach, supra, note 4.
25
These conversations consisted of telephone interviews and two London, U.K.
roundtables conducted during the summer of 2007 with over a dozen special advocates, the U.K.
Special Advocates Support Office and several United Kingdom defence counsel and civil society
organizations as well as persons associated with the SIRC process. The interviews were conducted
on the understanding that while the information obtained in them could be used freely, specific
views would not be attributed to individuals (except with their consent). For a fuller discussion of
the outcome of this research study, please see Seeking Justice, supra, note 10.
26
Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-23, s. 38 [hereinafter
“CSIS Act”].
27
Id., s. 41. SIRC also investigates complaints emanating from a denial of a security
clearance (s. 42), as well as matters that are referred to it by the Canadian Human Rights
Commission under s. 45 of the Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6, when the
23

362

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2008), 42 S.C.L.R. (2d)

(a) SIRC Immigration Role
Prior to 2002, SIRC also had an important role in immigration
proceedings in which the government was seeking to remove a
permanent resident (as opposed to a simple foreign national) on, among
other things, national security-related grounds.28
Under the Immigration Act, as it then was, where the Minister of
Immigration and the then-Solicitor General of Canada were of the
opinion, based on security or criminal intelligence reports received and
considered by them, that a permanent resident was a person inadmissible
to Canada on, inter alia, security grounds, a report would be issued to
SIRC. Once received by SIRC, the chair of the latter would assign one or
more members to investigate the report’s accuracy. Following its
deliberations on this question, SIRC would make a report to the
Governor-in-Council containing “its conclusion whether or not a
certificate should be issued” by the latter, along with reasons.
Subsequently, if it was persuaded that the named person was
inadmissible on, inter alia, security grounds, the Governor-in-Council
could then instruct the immigration minister to issue a certificate to that
effect.29 This certificate, in turn, resulted in the issuance of a deportation
order, subject to a truncated right of appeal of that deportation order to
the Immigration Appeal Division.30 Both the SIRC recommendation and
the decision of the Governor-in-Counsel were reviewable on standard
judicial review grounds in Federal Court.31
In the course of performing its assessment, SIRC members were
provided with the information the government had relied upon in making
its findings. In fact, under the CSIS Act, SIRC is entitled “to have access
to any information under the control of”, inter alia CSIS, “that relates to
the performance of the duties and functions of the Committee and to
receive from [CSIS] such information, reports and explanations as the
Committee deems necessary for the performance of its duties and
complaint raises security considerations. As well, SIRC can investigate complaints regarding the
Citizenship Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-29.
28
Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-2, s. 39 [hereinafter “Immigration Act”], now repealed
by IRPA.
29
Id., s. 40.
30
Id., ss. 27, 32 and s. 70(4), now repealed by the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act,
S.C. 2001, c. 27.
31
See, e.g., Al Yamani v. Canada (Solicitor General), [1995] F.C.J. No. 1453, [1996] 1
F.C. 174 (F.C.T.D.); Moumdjian v. Canada (Security Intelligence Review Committee), [1999] F.C.J.
No. 1160, [1999] 4 F.C. 624 (F.C.A.).
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functions”.32 Cabinet confidences are exempted from this rule, an
exception of limited significance in most of SIRC’s work.33
Further, under the CSIS Act, as incorporated into the then-existing
immigration law, SIRC had (and in relation to its still existing
complaints and investigations role, retains) broad powers to subpoena
persons and documents.34
(b) Procedure
(i) Disclosure
Under its rules of procedure for complaints, SIRC members decide
how much of the government information is disclosed to the named
person, after consultation with the director of CSIS. The SIRC rules
employed in immigration cases provided that, subject to the SIRC
member’s oath of secrecy,35 “it [was] within the discretion of the
assigned members in balancing the requirements of preventing threats to
the security of Canada and providing fairness to the person affected to
determine if the facts of the case justif[ied] that the substance of the
representations made by one party should be disclosed to one or more of
the other parties”.36
Prior to disclosure, SIRC would (and in relation to SIRC’s
continuing complaints role, does) consult with the director of CSIS, to
determine the extent of disclosure permissible under SIRC’s oath of
secrecy. SIRC engages in negotiations with CSIS to arrive at a
consensus as to what information can be released to the named person.
32

CSIS Act, supra, note 26, s. 39.
Murray Rankin, “The Security Intelligence Review Committee: Reconciling National
Security with Procedural Fairness” (1990) 3 Can. J. Admin. L. & Prac. 173, at 182 (“It must be
stressed that the Committee has access to virtually all information, even source reports collected by
the Service, and can use this information in reaching its decision. The only exception to this rule of
access pertains to Cabinet records in the possession of the Service, but in almost all complaints
cases, this statutory exception would be of limited relevance”).
34
CSIS Act, supra, note 26, s. 50, referenced in Immigration Act, supra, note 28, s. 40(5),
now repealed by IRPA.
35
Members of SIRC and its employees must comply with all security requirements under
the CSIS Act and take an oath of secrecy. Supra, note 26, s. 37. They are also “persons permanently
bound to secrecy” under the Security of Information Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. O-5, and are therefore
subject to that statute’s penalties for wrongful disclosure of sensitive information.
36
SIRC, Rules of Procedure of the Security Intelligence Review Committee in Relation to
its Function under Paragraph 38(c) of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, para.
46(2)(a). See also para. 48(4) (providing for a similar balancing where a party is excluded from vice
voce testimony).
33
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Where SIRC and the director disagreed firmly, in theory the question of
disclosure could be adjudicated by the Federal Court under section 38 of
the Canada Evidence Act,37 described below.38
In performing its functions, SIRC was and is empowered to hold ex
parte and in camera hearings to receive information that is not disclosed
on security grounds. In the ex parte hearings, several counsel are
present: counsel to CSIS, counsel for any witnesses, counsel for any
government departments with an interest in the case, and SIRC’s own
counsel.39 The latter include inside counsel and/or a SIRC legal agent.
(ii) SIRC Inside Counsel and SIRC Legal Agents
Inside counsel are employees of SIRC and part of its bureaucratic
staff and have a close, but still-arm’s length, working relationship with
CSIS. (Staff from both organizations have regular contact with each
other). At the time of this research, SIRC had two in-house counsel.40
SIRC counsel are charged with probing the government position,
and in so doing further the complainant’s interests. In immigration
matters, they were (and in relation to SIRC’s continuing complaints
function, are) charged with challenging decisions on the non-disclosure
of the information contained in the closed material, as well as crossexamining government witnesses in ex parte proceedings. Describing
this counsel’s role, a former SIRC legal advisor wrote in 1990:
The Committee’s counsel is instructed to cross-examine witnesses for
the Service with as much vigour as one would expect from the
complainant’s counsel. Having been present during the unfolding of
the complainant’s case, the Committee counsel is able to pursue the
same line of questions. In addition, however, since Committee counsel
has the requisite security clearance and has had the opportunity to
review files not available to the complainant’s counsel, he or she is
37

R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5.
This eventuality has not yet arisen. However, on occasion SIRC has received letters from
Department of Justice counsel acting on behalf of CSIS warning SIRC that if the disclosure of
information was not made in accordance with the direction of CSIS, that the Department of Justice
counsel would initiate proceedings under the Canada Evidence Act to prohibit the disclosure.
Seeking Justice, supra, note 10, at 7.
39
It should be noted that a lawyer holding a Top Secret clearance who represents a
department in the case (for instance) of a security clearance denial, and any departmental
representative is usually excluded from the hearing while a CSIS witness testifies before the Review
Committee ex parte in camera. Hence, there are occasions when not only the complainant and the
complainant’s counsel are excluded from the hearing. Seeking Justice, id.
40
Id.
38
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also able to explore issues and particulars that would be unknown to
the complainant’s counsel.41

Still, as this same author also noted, “a great deal turns on the ability
of Committee counsel to perform effectively in this unfamiliar role”.42
Outside counsel (or “legal agents”) may be retained in some cases
where, because of workload issues, inside counsel is not fully capable of
acting in the adversarial proceedings. In other cases, legal agents may be
retained where inside counsel judge that the case will require particularly
aggressive cross-examination of CSIS. Certainly, inside counsel will
conduct forceful cross-examination in the cases with which they are
charged. However, SIRC inside counsel must strive to remain (and
appear to remain) objective and impartial in order to protect SIRC from
any real or perceived apprehension of bias. In those cases where a
particularly aggressive cross-examination is required, SIRC may retain a
legal agent to preclude an apprehension of bias directed towards SIRC or
SIRC’s counsel. In other cases, where an issue of law is particularly
sensitive or complex, SIRC may retain legal agents to provide an expert
opinion.43
In practice, the extent to which legal agents are employed has
reportedly varied over the years, reflecting the predispositions of
changing SIRC administrators and the case load at SIRC. As of the time
of this writing, there were four legal agents on the SIRC list, of varying
levels of experience. These individuals were selected on a fairly informal
basis, without a formal application process, and are security-cleared. At
present, whenever a legal agent is retained by SIRC for a case, that
retainer must be authorized by the Department of Justice.44 Justice
generally accommodates SIRC requests for outside counsel and
understands the need for SIRC to maintain an arm’s length relationship
with government.45
41

Rankin, supra, note 33, at 184.
Id.
43
Seeking Justice, supra, note 10, at 8.
44
This authorization is required in accordance with s. 4 of the Government Contracts
Regulations, SOR/87-402 and the Treasury Board Common Services Policy. For a discussion of the
government’s legal agents rules, see online: <http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/dept-min/la-man/index.html>.
Note that rates of pay for legal agents on the government scale are lower than what these individuals
likely bill private clients.
45
SIRC sought a delegation of authority to contract for legal agents from the Department
of Justice on September 21, 2006 to ensure its independence and impartiality. By letter dated
October 21, 2006, the Assistant Deputy Attorney General for the Civil Litigation Branch of the
Department of Justice informed SIRC that a delegation of authority would not be granted and all
42
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The pool of lawyers across Canada from which SIRC can select
legal agents is small. SIRC can only retain outside counsel who are in
possession of a top secret clearance, are not in a conflict of interest with
either the government or the named person and have expertise in
litigation and national security matters. There may also be a language
requirement for the contract depending on the first language of the
named person or the CSIS witnesses.46
(iii) Relationship with Named Person
SIRC in-house and outside counsel are able to maintain contact with
the named person and his or her counsel throughout the process. SIRC
lawyers or legal agents may, therefore, question the named person even
after the former are fully apprised of the secret information against the
latter. In so doing, they take special care not to disclose (even
involuntarily) secret information.47
Even with this restriction, one of SIRC’s outside counsel is on
record as indicating that this questioning, despite being done in an
oblique manner to avoid involuntary disclosures of secret information, is
central in unearthing potentially exculpatory information and observed
that some cases at least have turned on information obtained from the
named person in this manner.48
After reviewing the CSIS file, SIRC inside or outside counsel will
have contact with the named person and their counsel to converse and to
obtain a list of questions that these persons may wish to have asked
during the secret proceeding. Likewise SIRC inside or outside counsel
may have contact with the named person after a summary of information
tabled in the secret proceedings has been provided to the latter. After
reviewing the summary, the named person may wish to have additional
CSIS witnesses appear before the Committee and hence be crossexamined by SIRC counsel.49

agents would continue to be approved for appointment by the Department of Justice on an ad hoc
basis. Seeking Justice, supra, note 10, at 8-9.
46
Seeking Justice, id.
47
Id., at 9.
48
Id. See also on this point, testimony of Mr. Gordon Cameron (SIRC outside counsel and
now special advocate), Proceedings of the Special Senate Committee on Anti-terrorism, Issue 4 —
Evidence — Meeting of February 11, 2008 (“it is sometimes only through continued access that you
are able to get the other side of the story, the explanation or the rebuttal of allegations made about a
person”).
49
Id.
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No SIRC in-house or outside counsel has ever reportedly received
any complaints from the government that this contact with the named
person has resulted in an involuntary disclosure injurious to national
security.50
2. The United Kingdom System of Special Advocates
(a) Overview
Before 1997, a decision to deport an individual from the United
Kingdom on national security grounds was strictly an executive
decision, made personally by the Home Secretary. The latter based his or
her determination on all relevant material, including information that
was withheld from the named person on national security grounds.
Where the government asserted national security confidentiality, the
deportation decision was referred to a panel (dubbed the “Three Wise
Men”) who reviewed the Home Secretary’s determination and made
recommendations on whether the removal order should stand.51
This system was challenged successfully by a named person in the
European Court of Human Rights. In Chahal v. U.K.,52 the Court
concluded that the U.K. system violated the European Convention on
Human Rights because it precluded court review and denied any means
for lawyers representing the named persons’ interests to challenge secret
information against the latter. In the course of deciding the case, the
Court alluded to the system employed by the Federal Court of Canada
involving what are now known as special advocates. Since no such
system then-existed before the Federal Court, the European Court was
probably referring to the SIRC system discussed above.
In direct response to Chahal, the U.K. parliament enacted the
Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997.53 This statute
created the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (“SIAC”), a
superior court of record sitting in panels comprising a High Court judge
50
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Treasury Solicitors Department, “Special Advocates: A Guide to the Role of Special
Advocates and the Special Advocates Support Office (SASO)”, online: <http://www.attorneygeneral.
gov.U.K./attachments/Special_Advocates.pdf> [hereinafter “Open Manual”], at 4. See also the
overview provided by Andrew Boon & Susan Nash, “Special Advocacy: Political Expediency and
Legal Roles in the Modern Judicial System” (2006) 9(1) Legal Ethics 101.
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Chahal v. United Kingdom (1997) 23 E.H.R.R. 413, [1996] Eur. Ct. H.R. 54 (Eur. Ct.
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(or other holder of high judicial office), an immigration adjudicator and
a lay member with security and intelligence expertise. SIAC hears
asylum and immigration appeals (and now citizenship revocation cases)
involving national security.54
(b) Special Advocates
The SIAC Act authorizes the appointment of a special advocate —
that is, “a person to represent the interests of an appellant in any
proceedings before the Special Immigration Appeals Commission from
which the appellant and any legal representative of his are excluded”.55
Once an appeal is lodged with SIAC against a government immigration
decision, the U.K. Secretary of State decides whether the appeal is likely
to implicate information that will not be disclosed to the named person
on national security grounds. In these circumstances, a special advocate
may be (and in practice invariably is) appointed by the U.K. Attorney
General. In fact, the government may not rely on “closed” — that is
secret — information at the hearings if no special advocate is
appointed.56
While special advocates were once appointed to a specific case by
the Attorney-General, named persons now select a special advocate from
the roster. In practice, the Special Advocates Support Office (“SASO”),
a division of the Treasury Solicitor’s Department working at arm’s
length from the rest of the department, informs the named person’s
solicitors of the appointment and provides the list of barristers on the
special advocate roster. The named person is asked to name his or her
preference of lead and junior special advocates, subject to availability
and the absence of any conflict of interest.57
(i) Key Functions
(A) CHALLENGING THE GOVERNMENT CASE
As noted, the SA acts in the best interest of the named person. SAs
are specifically charged in SIAC and control order proceedings with “(a)
making submissions to the court at any hearings from which the relevant
54
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party and his legal representatives are excluded; (b) cross-examining
witnesses at any such hearings; and (c) making written submissions to
the court”.58
In practice, SAs may present arguments on the admissibility of
government information, albeit under rules that are quite permissive on
the question of admissibility.59 SAs presumably present arguments on the
weight information should be given by the tribunal. SAs do also crossexamine government witnesses, exploring inferences drawn from
government information or inconsistencies in witnesses’ testimony.60
Lord Carlile, the independent examiner of U.K. anti-terrorism laws,
has reported that SA “analysis and examination of factual matters” has
been rigorous.61 Further, there have in fact been instances where SAs
have challenged successfully at least part of the government’s case by
noting discrepancies in the government’s approach between cases. In
one circumstance, the government used information in one case that had
been discredited in the other. The government was challenged
successfully on this practice by the SA, who happened to be the same
person in both cases. All told, by summer 2007, there had reportedly
been three successful SIAC appeals (and several bail hearings) in which
the SA had played a significant role.62 In a number of other cases, the SA
has pressed the government on matters of consistency and disclosure
with significant impact, but without altering the overall outcome of the
case.63
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(B) PRESSING FOR FULLER DISCLOSURE TO THE SPECIAL ADVOCATE
HIMSELF OR HERSELF
The SIAC rules require the government to serve on the SA a copy of
the closed material.64 The nature of the closed information provided to
SAs varies. Sometimes, for instance, SAs do receive actual transcriptions
of intercepted communications. In other instances, SAs receive
analytical summaries or assessments prepared by the security services
that may quote from intercept materials. In the latter instance, SAs worry
that the assessment is selective, reflecting the government’s position and
not necessarily a full or fully contextualized rendition of recorded
conversations. Moreover, these summaries sometimes contain “piled”
hearsay — that is, second-hand (or perhaps seventh or eighth hand)
accounts of inculpatory conversations. Some of these accounts may be
supplied by other security services, in summary analytical form. In this
manner, subjective analysis is compounded by subjective analysis.65
In his 2004 review of the relevant provisions in U.K. anti-terrorism
law, Lord Carlile concluded “that there has been meticulous attention to
the importance of disclosure in an appropriate way of material adverse to
the Secretary of State’s case or otherwise of assistance to the
Appellant”.66 There is no consensus on this point, however. Several SAs
suggest that while they interpret the rules as obliging disclosure of both
inculpatory and exculpatory information, the government sometimes
fails to disclose exculpatory information in its possession. SAs have had
to rely on the government’s own assessment of what information is
relevant. For this reason, the material SAs themselves receive is
sometimes redacted — that is, portions are blacked out supposedly
because they are irrelevant.67
The government’s assessment of what is relevant reportedly does not
always dovetail with SA views. SAs are reportedly aware of cases in
which important exculpatory information was not disclosed, but only
learned of this fact because the same SA appeared on two different
cases. In one of these cases, information pertinent to (and exculpatory in)
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another case was disclosed that had not been provided in the original
matter.68
SAs have, therefore, sometimes pressed the government to disclose
to the SAs themselves more than is on the closed record. While their
legal right to do so is unclear, SAs obviously see their role as being not
simply reactive; that is, to respond to and probe the information already
provided by government. Instead, they have taken a proactive approach,
asking for more information.69 The SA capacity to press for full
disclosure will likely be enhanced by recent procedural rule changes.
Under these amendments, the government is expressly obligated to
disclose both a statement of the information on which it relies and “any
exculpatory material” of which it is aware.70 The new rules also set out
clear standards of how the government is to conduct its search for
exculpatory materials.71
By the time of this research, it remained to be seen how diligently
the government would perform these responsibilities. SAs complained
that government disclosure of information to the SAs under the original
rules had often been very tardy, to the extent that SAs have often not
been able to execute effectively their function in pressing for greater
disclosure to the named persons themselves, described below.72
SA concerns about government disclosure extend beyond documents.
One SA reported that over time, the government and SIAC judges have
been more restrictive in terms of the sorts of persons they will allow to
be cross-examined by SAs. Whereas previously, SAs could crossexamine “agency-handlers”, the security services no longer permit
questioning of persons with close knowledge of sources, and SIAC has
backed the government position.73
(C) ENHANCING DISCLOSURE TO THE NAMED PERSONS AND THEIR
COUNSEL
SAs clearly see as one of their key (and perhaps principal) roles
pressing for greater disclosure to the named persons and their counsel. In
performing his or her functions, the SA serves the best interest of the
68
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named person by acting as an impartial assessor of secret information
and championing its release where the SA believes it warranted. Thus,
having vetted the closed information, SAs may urge the release of
innocuous information, and may obtain the consent of the government to
this disclosure. Sometimes this release may come in the form of a
sanitized summary of closed information. In other instances, it may
constitute the actual information in question. For example, the SA may
find an alternative, open source for some of the closed information,
thereby discrediting the view that this information is non-disclosable to
the named person. One SA indicated, for example, that in some cases
SAs have been able to force the government to provide fuller disclosure
by doing Internet searches to establish that information that was being
withheld was readily available over the Internet.74 Cross-referencing
closed material against public source information available elsewhere is
obviously a time-consuming activity, one that SAs have in the past said
is difficult for them to undertake.75
(D) COMMUNICATING EXISTENCE OF GROUNDS FOR APPEALS
SAs do not themselves have standing to appeal SIAC decisions to
the Court of Appeal, a handicap that some SAs believe should be
corrected. However, the SA may seek permission from the tribunal to
contact the named person and communicate the existence of grounds for
appeal. The actual grounds may concern closed information, and may
not, therefore, be disclosable. However, the SA would then be able to
plead closed grounds before the Court of Appeal.76
(c) Shortcomings of the Special Advocate System
The single most controversial aspect of the U.K. system is the
inability of SAs to communicate with the named person once they are in
“closed”. That is, once an SA has been given access to the closed
material in the case, she or he may have no communication with the
named persons or their solicitor without the permission of the tribunal.
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This permission, in turn, can only be provided after the government has
a chance to respond to the request.77
As several SAs argued before a parliamentary committee in 2005,
the fact that questions to named persons during the closed session are
vetted by the government — the opponent in the proceedings —
“precludes communications even on matters of pure legal strategy”.78
The questions asked — passed through the tribunal and security services
— could well spark the interest of the security services, in a manner
prejudicial to the named person. A subsequent failure of the SA in the
proceeding to then rely on whatever answer was provided by the named
person would also attract the attention of the security services.79
Without question, these strict limitations on communications between
named persons and special advocates constitute the most dramatic
departure from conventional fair trial standards and the most controversial
aspect of the U.K. special advocate system. They also differ from the
SIRC approach described above, which permits continued communication.
The U.K. communication rules reflect the government’s preoccupation
with inadvertent disclosure; that is, information conveyed to the named
person through the questions asked. This concern with inadvertent
disclosure does not, however, extend to government counsel or the
security services. The latter are not restricted in their communications
once they have accessed secret material and do question the named
person before or during the proceedings. This inconsistent approach on
inadvertent disclosure may reflect an expectation (unwarranted, in the
eyes of SAs) that those prosecuting the case are less likely to ask the
sorts of questions that unintentionally convey secret information.80
77
See SIAC Rules, S.I. 2003/1034, r. 36: “After the Secretary of State serves material on
the special advocate … the special advocate must not communicate with any person [other than,
e.g., the government, the tribunal] [except at the] direction of the Commission.” Where the SA
requests directions from SIAC authorizing communication, “(a) the Commission must notify the
Secretary of State of the request; and (b) the Secretary of State must, within a period specified by
the Commission, file with the Commission and serve on the special advocate notice of any objection
which he has to the proposed communication, or to the form in which it is proposed to be made”.
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Supra, note 75, at 19.
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In our research, SAs consistently acknowledged that their inability to
communicate (other than in the narrowest circumstances) with the
named persons or their solicitors after receiving closed material impairs
their effectiveness.81 SAs are obviously ill positioned to challenge the
credibility of government information in the same way they might do so
in a regular proceeding; that is, by offering an exculpatory explanation
(of the sort that can only be derived from the named person him or
herself) for superficially incriminating information. For example, a
named person impugned by a secret government informer might be able
to cast doubt on the information provided by the informer in a way that
no SA could (e.g., the informer and the named person have a history of
animosity that might drive the former to lie about the latter).
SAs are technically permitted to call witnesses on behalf of the
named person, but one SA has written that “this is a practical
impossibility because even if one knew what witnesses were available,
calling them to address issues of fact would alert them to the nature of
the issues that have to be kept closed in the first place. Expert witnesses
will be unable to comment on a secret assessment without themselves
being security-cleared and having authorized access to the resources of
the security service on which the assessment is based.”82 Moreover, if
SAs put forward a positive case in the closed sessions, “that positive
case is inevitably based on conjecture. They have no way of knowing
whether it is the case that the appellant himself would wish to
advance.”83
All told, SAs indicated that they were usually ill equipped to
undermine the government’s theory of the case — as noted, only a few
cases have collapsed when probed by the SA. Some SAs indicated that
in circumstances where the government’s case cannot be challenged
effectively on the basis of the information available to the SA, they
sometimes are obliged to take a more passive role in the hearings,
declining for example to pursue lines of cross-examination that may lead
in unexpected (and, for the named person, potentially) prejudicial
directions.84
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The defence lawyers to whom we spoke emphasized quite pointedly
that the SAs’ ability to offer a full answer and defence is non-existent,
given the constraints on communication between the SA and the named
person. They cautioned against overstating the utility of SAs in
challenging the government case. Critics of the SA system urge that a
system in which named persons do not know the case against them
cannot be fair. It contaminates the system of justice and breeds cynicism
on the part of named persons.85 SAs “give a veneer of legality” to this
fundamentally unfair system.86 One former SA who resigned in protest
writes that his “role was to provide a fig leaf of respectability and a false
legitimacy to indefinite detention without knowledge of the accusations
being made and without any kind of criminal charge or trial”.87
These complaints have been echoed by parliamentary committees. In
July 2007, the U.K. Parliament Joint Committee on Human Rights
issued a strongly worded report describing the special advocate system
as “‘Kafkaesque’ or like the Star Chamber”.88 On the specific issue of
special advocates and communication with named persons, it made the
following recommendation:
In our view it is essential, if Special Advocates are to be able to
perform their function, that there is greater opportunity than currently
exists for communication between the Special Advocate and the
controlled person. … With appropriate guidance and safeguards, we
think it is possible to relax the current prohibition whilst ensuring that
sensitive national security information is not disclosed. We therefore
recommend a relaxation of the current prohibition on any
communication between the special advocate and the person concerned
or their legal representative after the special advocate has seen the
closed material.89

The Committee also criticized the level of disclosure made by the
government to the named person — concluding that secrecy is
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sometimes excessive — and the low burden of proof the government
must satisfy to make-out its SIAC case.

IV. BILL C-3 AND SPECIAL ADVOCATES
This article now turns to reviewing Bill C-3 and the aftermath of the
Charkaoui decision.
1. Post-Charkaoui Policy Focus
The Supreme Court released the Charkaoui decision on February 23,
2007. Critically, it suspended its declaration of constitutional invalidity
for one year, until February 23, 2008. Upon the expiry of this deadline,
those named persons subject to a certificate deemed reasonable under the
prior system could “apply to have the certificates quashed”.90 Put another
way, individuals who the government claimed were grave threats to
national security would no longer be subject to the security certificate
process, unless Parliament enacted a replacement system curing the
constitutional deficiencies of the IRPA by late February 2008.
Not surprisingly, in the immediate aftermath of the Charkaoui
decision, the policy focus was on special counsel. For instance, a month
after Charkaoui, a special senate committee recommended that a special
counsel process be extended to all proceedings where “information is
withheld from a party in the interest of national security and he or she is
therefore not in a position to make full answer and defence”, including
under the IRPA, the Criminal Code terrorist group listing process, the
Charities Registration (Security Information) Act91 and the Canada
Evidence Act.92 Moreover, the committee urged that the special counsel
be empowered to communicate with the affected parties after receiving
confidential information, subject to guidelines designed to bar the
release of secret information. The counterpart Commons committee also
recommended a comprehensive “panel of special counsel” for national
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security cases,93 but without weighing in on the precise design of this
system.
The government, for its part, remained silent on its response to
Charkaoui through the winter, spring, summer and early Fall of 2007. Its
only pronouncement on the issue came on July 18, 2007, when the
government responded to the above-noted Commons committee
recommendations. The government affirmed the need to address the
Supreme Court’s February ruling within one year, and simply indicated
that it was studying “the possibility of establishing a special advocate
role in the security certificate process”. 94
Despite the notoriety of the security certificate system and the
controversy and public attention sparked by it, no public consultations
were held and no formal notice was given of the government’s approach
to the special counsel issue until Bill C-3 was tabled in the House of
Commons and received first reading on October 22, 2007, fully eight
months after the Charkaoui decision and four months prior to the expiry
of the one-year suspension of the declaration of invalidity.
2. The Bill C-3 Model
As noted above, the Supreme Court of Canada canvassed a number
of special counsel options in Charkaoui without mandating a particular
model. The government was, therefore, presented with a choice in the
crafting of Bill C-3, including the choice of building on Canada’s
indigenous experience with SIRC in immigration and other matters. In
comparison, a U.K.-style model — with its strict restrictions on
continued contact between special advocate and named person once the
former had reviewed the secret information and concerns about full
disclosure — would constitute a departure from the SIRC approach.
Indeed, the Supreme Court itself was alive to criticisms of the U.K.
system, including those concerning restrictions on contact between
named person and special advocate.95
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Nevertheless, for reasons that have never been satisfactorily
explained to these authors, Bill C-3 drew its clear inspiration from the
United Kingdom.96 As Roach observes, in so doing the government
selected, and Parliament ratified, “the only alternative that the [Supreme]
Court recognized [in Charkaoui] had been subject to criticism and the
one alternative that arguably achieves the worst job of all the alternatives
in ensuring fair treatment of the affected person”.97
(a) Features of Bill C-3 Special Advocate Model
Pursuant to Bill C-3, the Minister of Justice is instructed to
“establish a list of persons who may act as special advocates”.98
Although not in a solicitor-client relationship with the named person,99
the “special advocate’s role is to protect the interests of the permanent
resident or foreign national in a [security certificate] proceeding … when
information or other evidence is heard in the absence of the public and of
the permanent resident or foreign national and their counsel”.100 To this
end, the special advocate “may challenge (a) the Minister’s claim that
the disclosure of information or other evidence would be injurious to
national security or endanger the safety of any person; and (b) the
relevance, reliability and sufficiency of information or other evidence
that is provided by the Minister and is not disclosed to the permanent
resident or foreign national and their counsel, and the weight to be given
to it”.101
In terms of his or her specific methods, the special advocate may:
96
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for the U.K. model because “the Supreme Court mandate was to make sure that the special advocate
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advocate system, so that was essentially how we got to the U.K. model as the starting point.” Mr.
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(a) make oral and written submissions with respect to the information
and other evidence that is provided by the Minister and is not disclosed
to the permanent resident or foreign national and their counsel;
(b) participate in, and cross-examine witnesses who testify during, any
part of the proceeding that is held in the absence of the public and of
the permanent resident or foreign national and their counsel; and
(c) exercise, with the judge’s authorization, any other powers that are
necessary to protect the interests of the permanent resident or foreign
national.102

There are, however, serious restrictions on the special advocate’s ability
to communicate. The government is obliged to, inter alia, “file with the
Court the information and other evidence on which the certificate is
based” once the matter is referred to the Federal Court.103 The special
advocate is entitled to receive this information.104 However, upon receipt
of the secret information to which the named person is denied access,
“the special advocate may, during the remainder of the proceeding,
communicate with another person about the proceeding only with the
judge’s authorization and subject to any conditions that the judge
considers appropriate”.105
(b) Shortcomings of the Bill C-3 Model
Following the tabling of Bill C-3, the bill was welcomed by some106
and critiqued by others.107 For their part, these authors joined others in
critiquing the special advocate model on several grounds.108
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(i) Full Disclosure
First, the law specifically authorizes the special advocate to review
secret information provided by the government to the judge in the
security certificate process. However, it includes no express procedures
for the special advocate to reach beyond this information and seek and
obtain government records not already disclosed to the court (other than
simply to ask the judge to oblige this disclosure). A special advocate will
be hard pressed to persuade a judge to allow this access: He or she will
be reduced to arguing that he or she suspects that there might be further
relevant material, but not having access to it, will have difficulty making
this case.
Certainly, the Federal Court currently demands that all relevant
information be disclosed to the court itself.109 Yet, what the government
considers “relevant” and what a special advocate charged with defending
the best interests of the detained person considers “relevant” will not
always correspond. That is a lesson we extracted from the United
Kingdom experience described above. It is also consistent with the
phenomena of tunnel vision described by Kent Roach; that is
… a process in which authorities, often with the noblest of intentions,
fixate on a person’s purported guilt, discount or ignore information that
points to the person’s innocence and interpret ambiguous and even
innocent information as evidence of a person’s guilt. Tunnel vision is
not necessarily the product of deliberate misconduct by officials, but
can be the product of institutional pressures that increase as the state
has invested much time and resources in focusing on a suspect. 110

The risk of tunnel vision is arguably more acute in relation to processes
reliant on security intelligence rather than evidence. First, evidence
marshalled in the criminal context is variable, but generally falls within
an expected range of forensic and witness information, notes taken
contemporaneously by police officers and the like. Police agencies have
109

See, e.g., Re Charkaoui, [2006] F.C.J. No. 868, 2006 FCA 206, at para. 24 (F.C.A.), on
appeal to the Supreme Court at the time of this writing. In that same case, however, the court also
focused on the fact that security certificates are administrative and not criminal proceedings, and
tailored its position on disclosure accordingly, denying that R. v. Stinchcombe, [1991] S.C.J. No. 83,
[1991] 3 S.C.R. 326 (S.C.C.), rules apply in the security certificate context. It should be noted that
the outcome of security certificate processes may be more serious than anything the Criminal Code,
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 could impose — indefinite detention without charge and removal to torture. In
these circumstances, the nominal invocation of criminal versus administrative to define the scope of
disclosure rules is utterly unpersuasive and inconsistent with the notion that “fundamental justice” in
s. 7 varies with the circumstances, not least the gravity of consequences to the interested party.
110
Roach, supra, note 4.
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established rules and procedures on chain of custody and the entire
process is hemmed by rigorous rules of evidence governing admissibility
(not least, rules barring hearsay, for the most part).
In comparison, as discussed further below, security certificate
proceedings are constrained by virtually none of these rules and the
information on which they turn may include direct evidence of
culpability (such as transcripts of intercepts) but (as we understand it) is
often more circumstantial, involving risk assessments and analysts
reports far removed from direct evidence of conduct. The product
ultimately tabled in court may be a Canadian analyst report, drawing on
the analyst report of allied agencies. Analysts report piled on analyst
report compounds subjectivity with subjectivity, and information is
shifted and discarded by many hands before being presented in its
refined form in court. In these circumstances, the prospect that relevant
(and indeed exculpatory) information might go missing seems enormous.
Second, it cannot be forgotten that security certificate processes are
ex parte. Unlike in conventional criminal trials, the interested party is
not present, and therefore is in no position to query unfamiliar
government interpretations of events that the person may have been part
of. Nor can they identify gaps in the record they know must exist
because of their familiarity with these events. The special advocate is left
to operate without these insights.
Under these circumstances, disclosure rules cannot rely simply on
the good faith of government without risking serious miscarriages of
justice. We took the view that Bill C-3 should integrate an independent
third party into the process, able to examine the full government files
and certify full disclosure. Given its long-standing familiarity with
security intelligence and its expertise in reviewing files of this nature, we
urged that SIRC be authorized to conduct such a process, when asked to
do so by a special advocate.
(ii) Continued Contact between Special Advocate and Named Person
Second, the law does not close the door on continued contact
between the special advocate and the interested party subject to the
certificate. Nor, however, does it affirmatively guard this right. Instead,
this is a matter left to the discretion of the judge. Given the
uncontroversial practice of allowing continued access in the SIRC
context, and the vital nature of that continued contact to the effectiveness
of the SIRC counsel in at least some cases, we urged that language of the
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bill be reversed, creating a presumption of continued access, subject only
to reasonable limitations necessary to protect the integrity of the secret
information.
(iii) Range of Complaints Concerning Bill C-3
The statistical frequency and nature of these and other issues
commentators raised with parliamentarians during deliberations over the
bill is estimated in Table 1:
Table 1: Range and Statistical Frequency of Issues Raised by
Non-governmental Witnesses in Parliamentary Proceedings111
Issue

Commons
(% out of 20)

Senate
(% out of 22)

Security certificate regime restricts communication
between advocate and named person once former has
seen secret evidence

55%

59%

Security certificate regime still does not allow full
answer and defence by named person

45%

59%

No explicit (or an insufficient) rejection of evidence
derived from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment and/or other concerns about the reliability of
information used in security certificate proceedings

40%

50%

“Reasonableness” standard of proof required of
government too low

40%

36%

Nature of the relationship between special advocate
and named person is unclear and/or no (or insufficient)
guarantee of confidentiality in relation to information
provided by named person to special advocate

40%

9%

Creation of special advocate roster not independent
from government and selection process opaque/lack of
choice of special advocate by individual

35%

13%

Potential that not all relevant information will be
disclosed to the judge and special advocate

35%

45%

Security certificate regime creates a system of unequal
treatment between citizens and non-citizens

30%

32%

No (or insufficient) assurances of resources, staff for
special advocates

30%

5%

111
Data drawn from transcripts of Commons and Senate committee proceedings, available
through <http://www.parl.gc.ca/LEGISINFO/index.asp?Language=E&Chamber=N&StartList=
A&EndList=Z&Session=15&Type=0&Scope=I&query=5278&List=stat>.
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Issue

Commons
(% out of 20)

Senate
(% out of 22)

Potential for process to lead to indefinite detention

30%

23%

Law has not addressed removal to torture

25%

23%

Limited appeal rights

20%

18%

Security certificate regime unduly augments the power
of the security services

5%

—

Power of special advocate to call witnesses and
present documentary evidence unclear

5%

9%

No periodic review of the workings of the law

—

5%

Legislation includes no anti-discrimination clause

—

9%

Legislation fails to define sufficiently concepts such as
national security

—

5%

3. Parliamentary Proceedings
As noted, Bill C-3 was tabled in Parliament in October 2007, only
months before the February 2008 deadline imposed by the Supreme
Court for the expiry of the old system. Notably, the period between
October 22, 2007 and February 23, 2008 contained only 49 scheduled
sitting days in the House of Commons (seven weeks) and 54 sitting days
in the Senate (eight weeks). To the best of our knowledge, at no point
was serious consideration given by the government or by named persons
to asking the Supreme Court to extend its deadline, thereby allowing
careful consideration of Bill C-3.
The parliamentary proceedings reviewing Bill C-3 were, therefore,
conducted under pressure.112 These authors spent a number of hours

112

See Mr. Dave MacKenzie (Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Public Safety,
CPC), 39th Parl., 2nd Sess., Hansard, No 019 (Monday, November 19, 2007):
The Supreme Court has given the government an opportunity to amend the legislation,
but has set February 23, 2008 as the deadline. Let me be clear on this point. If we do not
pass this bill by February 2008, all current security certificates would be quashed. The
certificate process could no longer be used to detain these individuals or impose
conditions of release. Nor could it form the basis for their inadmissibility to Canada. This
would pose a serious threat to the safety of the Canadian public and the security of
Canada. … The passage of Bill C-3 is essential to the continued operation and use of the
security certificate process contained within the Immigration and Refugee Protection
Act.
Hon. Stockwell Day (Minister of Public Safety), Standing Committee on Public Safety and National
Security, Evidence, 39th Parl., 2nd Sess., Tuesday, November 27, 2007:
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discussing Bill C-3 with parliamentarians in Fall 2007 and early winter
2008. In these conversations it became clear that at least some
parliamentarians inclined to tinker substantially with the bill were
deterred by the prospect that the clock would run out, prompting the
release of individuals the government characterized as dangerous
terrorists. There was also serious concern that Bill C-3 would be
declared a confidence matter by the government, and carried
amendments might precipitate an election. The Liberal official
opposition, in particular, did not relish the prospect of fighting an
election on a terrorism-related theme. There is no doubt in these authors’
minds that this political environment affected the willingness of
parliamentarians to consider seriously amendments to Bill C-3.
When referred to committee after second reading in the Commons,
the initial witness list was thin, and largely (although not entirely)
excluded groups and individuals who opposed security certificates writ
large in favour of witnesses (like these authors) who proposed
refinement to the Bill C-3 model. Only after some controversy over this
roster was the list broadened — at the eleventh hour — to include groups
such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and the “support”
groups for several of the named persons.113 In sum total, the bill spent
107 calendar days in the House of Commons. During that time, it was
debated on seven days in the House of Commons and studied during six
days in committee. Put another way, the ratio of days on which the bill
received parliamentary attention to calendar days in the Commons was
(a modest) 1/8.
During debate over Bill C-3, commentators occasionally justified
their positions with doubtful construals of Charkaoui. The government,
for example, objected (properly) to assertions that the Supreme Court
had declared security certificates per se unconstitutional.114 On the other
hand, the government itself occasionally defended parts of its Bill C-3

I would ask members — we’re not asking for undue haste nor asking people to be
imprudent in terms of how quickly you move on this — to keep in mind that we need
this done. This has to be passed before February 23. Otherwise, not only will the
provision be quashed, but people who are presently under detention who have been
deemed by the Federal Court to be under detention would in fact not be in that case.
There is not a rash urgency, but there is a compelling time constraint here, and I would
ask that you respectfully consider that also.
113
On this point, see discussion among parliamentarians at Standing Committee on Public
Safety and National Security, Evidence, 39th Parl., 2nd Sess., Tuesday, December 4, 2007.
114
See, e.g., Hon. Stockwell Day, id.
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approach with opaque invocations of Charkaoui that arguably overstated
the holding of that case.115
Ultimately, the Commons committee focused its amendments on
four substantive issues: creating a species of confidentiality obligation
for information obtained by the special advocate during private
conversations with the interested party; giving some priority to the
choice of the interested party in identifying who will serve as the special
advocate; obliging the government to provide appropriate resources to
the special advocate; and, excluding the prospect of information
produced by torture or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment from
being used as evidence in the proceeding.116
The last change may prove quite important, as discussed below.
However, none of these changes addressed the core preoccupations
about special advocates animating the debate in the United Kingdom;
specifically, continued access between special advocate and named
person or full disclosure to the special advocate. Nor did they harmonize
the special advocate model with that associated with SIRC proceedings.
The Senate committee proceeding was even more perfunctory. The
bill only arrived in the Senate on February 6 — quite literally days
before the expiry of the Supreme Court’s deadline. In sum total, the bill
was before the Senate for six calendar days. There was little real
prospect of close Senate scrutiny. Indeed, the government side warned
against close scrutiny:
Bill C-3 was introduced in the House on October 22, 2007 and spent
three and a half months there. It has been thoroughly studied and if we
in the Senate fail to act in a timely fashion it will have serious
implications for Canada’s security. If the deadline expires, upon
application, persons subject to a security certificate could have their
certificates quashed. This means they could no longer be held in
detention and could not be subject to any condition of release. This
could be disastrous given the nature of the threats these persons
represent.117

115
See Hon. Stockwell Day, id., responding to a question about limitations on continued
contact between special advocate and named person by asserting that the “Supreme Court realized
that such a provision was sometimes necessary”.
116
House of Commons, Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security, 1st
Report, 39th Parl., 2nd Sess. (December 7, 2007), available online: <http://cmte.parl.gc.ca/
cmte/CommitteePublication.aspx?COM=13205&Lang=1&SourceId=221244>.
117
Hon. David Tkachuk, Debates of the Senate (Hansard), 2nd Sess., 39th Parl., Vol. 144,
Issue 31, Thursday, February 7, 2008.
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The real time constraints under which the Senate operated raised the
ire of senators.118 Their concern is understandable. The Senate Special
Committee on Anti-terrorism to which the bill was referred has an
institutional knowledge on security certificates and other anti-terrorism
issues not shared by its Commons counterpart.119
Despite a marathon session in which the Senate heard from 24
witnesses in a single day,120 and despite the committee members’ obvious
expertise and familiarity with the issue, the Senate made no amendments
to the bill. Based again on our personal communications with senators,
the political backdrop was prominent in their thinking. Although dominant
in the Senate, the Liberal Party was not prepared to pass amendments,
then requiring reconsideration of the bill by the Commons. This delay
would take the legislative process past the February 23 deadline and
allow the government to pin blame for the expiry of the security
certificate system on the unelected upper chamber.121 By the committee
member’s own reckoning, their desultory review reflected the imminence
of the Charkaoui deadline. In its report back to the Senate, the committee
wrote:
Recognizing the impending February 23, 2008 deadline imposed by
the Supreme Court of Canada for Parliament to rectify the
unconstitutionality of the existing security certificate procedure, the
Special Senate Committee on Anti-terrorism is adopting Bill C-3, An
Act to amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (certificate
and special advocate) and to make a consequential amendment to
another Act, without amendment.
The Committee would have appreciated more time to reflect upon all
aspects of this bill and the views of those concerned, given the lifealtering effects that security certificates have on those named in them,
and the reflection the process has on Canadian society and values.

118

See, e.g., Hon. George Baker & Hon. Serge Joyal, Debates of the Senate (Hansard), 2nd
Sess., 39th Parl., Vol. 144, Issue 31, Thursday, February 7, 2008.
119
See discussion in Craig Forcese, “Fixing the Deficiencies of Parliament Review of Antiterrorism Law: Lessons from the United Kingdom and Australia” (2008) 14:4 IRPP Choices 2.
120
See Proceedings of the Special Senate Committee on Anti-terrorism, Issue 4 — Minutes
of Proceedings, Monday, February 11, 2008.
121
Bill C-3 was being considered at about the same time that pressure was being mounted
on the Senate to pass the government’s omnibus crime bill. That pressure came, in part, in the form
of a motion in the Commons calling on the Senate to move expeditiously on this crime bill that the
government declared a confidence measure. Based again on our personal communications, the
politics of this event clearly infused the Bill C-3 proceedings. See the motion described in House of
Commons, Journals, No. 49, 39th Parl., 2nd Sess., Tuesday, February 12, 2008.
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Because of the tight timeline for examining Bill C-3, the Committee
was not able to hear from all parties who requested to appear. 122

When the committee report was debated in the Senate, even
Conservative senators expressed concern at its content and the process
that had been followed: “Sometimes we hold our noses when it comes
time to adopt bills, and we have done so in the past with other
legislation, knowing that in the near future we will correct the errors we
have agreed to let through. That is the sort of legislation we have before
us now.”123
4. Implications
In personal communications with these authors, counsel for those
subject to security certificates have already indicated that they will
challenge the special advocate regime on constitutional grounds.
Inevitably, the Bill C-3 regime will be juxtaposed with the SIRC system,
raising serious questions as to whether the C-3 regime will be sustained.
The bill creates an architecture in which Federal Court judges may
approximate the benefits of the SIRC approach. For example, they may
authorize SIRC-like continued contact between the special advocate and
named person and pursue aggressively concerns about the scope of
disclosure to the Court and special advocate themselves. Absent these
careful innovations, however, the chances of a successful constitutional
challenge become more acute.
It is true that in its section 1 analysis in Charkaoui, the Supreme
Court indicated that the government need not come up with the perfect
system.124 It remains to be seen, however, whether the Court will take the
same approach where those with no constitutional right at stake (for
example, a government employee complaining to SIRC about security
clearance denied on a recommendation from CSIS) have a better system
than those detained and potentially removed to torture under a security
certificate.

122
Special Senate Committee on the Anti-terrorism Act, Second Report, 39th Parl., 2nd
Sess., Tuesday, February 12, 2008.
123
Hon. Pierre Claude Nolin, Debates of the Senate (Hansard), 2nd Sess., 39th Parl., Vol.
144, Issue 32, Tuesday, February 12, 2008. In direct response to the scant time available to it when
Bill C-3 was promulgated, the Special Senate Committee on Anti-terrorism is now engaged in an
extensive, supplemental study on the security certificate process.
124
Charkaoui, supra, note 90, at para. 85.
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V. OTHER FEATURES OF BILL C-3
Bill C-3’s obvious focus is on the new special advocate system. The
law also includes, however, a number of other changes and makes
several omissions with potentially significant implications for the
security certificate regime. In our view, these features include both
improvements and missed opportunities.
1. Improvements in the Exclusion of Coerced Information
As noted above, one of the amendments made to Bill C-3 during the
parliamentary process was the inclusion of emphatic language rejecting
the use of information in security certificate proceedings “that is
believed on reasonable grounds to have been obtained as a result of the
use of torture within the meaning of section 269.1 of the Criminal Code,
or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment within the
meaning of the Convention Against Torture”.125
(a) Information and Interrogation Post-9/11
The change may reflect past controversies over the sorts of
information allegedly deployed in security certificate proceedings. As
government officials have repeatedly underscored, Canada depends
heavily on intelligence supplied by allied agencies.126 However,
according to testimony in Federal Court, CSIS analysts supplying
intelligence used to support security certificates have not asked even
suspect foreign agencies producing this information if it is the product of
torture.127
If true, this is a significant omission, given the notorious record on
torture of many front-line states in the “war on terror” and even close
Canadian allies. Much of the controversy over post-9/11 interrogation
tactics has focused on whether the so-called stress or alternative
interrogation techniques employed by the U.S. military or CIA cross the
line of CID treatment or even torture. Various U.S. government memos
125

IRPA, s. 83(1.1).
For a discussion on security intelligence information-sharing, see Craig Forcese,
National Security Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2008), at c. 12.
127
Harkat v. Canada, Court File DES-4-02, Extract Of Proceedings, vol. 2, Evidence of
P.G. (November 3, 2005). See also description in Andrew Duffy, “CSIS Agent Didn’t Ask If
Informant Was Tortured” Ottawa Citizen, November 4, 2005, at F.1.
126
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describe interrogation “stress” techniques approved for use in overseas
military interrogations.128 News stories, meanwhile, have reported on
CIA interrogation strategies. The latter reportedly include: forceful
shaking, an open-handed slap “aimed at causing pain and triggering
fear”, a “hard open-handed slap to the stomach” designed “to cause pain,
but not internal injury”; forcing detainees “to stand, handcuffed and with
their feet shackled to an eye bolt in the floor for more than 40 hours”,
producing “exhaustion and sleep deprivation”; chilling the detainee by
leaving them to “stand naked in a cell kept near 50 degrees” and dousing
them with cold water; and, water-boarding, a process by which a
detainee is “bound to an inclined board, feet raised and head slightly
below the feet. Cellophane is wrapped over the prisoner’s face and water
is poured over him”, triggering powerful gag reflexes.129
Reports on happenings at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq disclose even
more extreme measures. At Abu Ghraib, concludes a U.S. military
report, unauthorized, but intentional violent and sexual abuses included
“acts causing bodily harm using unlawful force as well as sexual
offenses including, but not limited to rape, sodomy and indecent
assault”.130 Media reports have pointed to the use of extreme (and
occasionally deadly) interrogation techniques at places like Bagram,
Afghanistan and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.131
Summarizing the U.S. record extracted from 100,000 government
documents disclosed under U.S. information laws, the American Civil
Liberties Association reported in 2006
… a systemic pattern of torture and abuse of detainees in U.S. custody
in Afghanistan, the U.S. Naval Base Station at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba,
Iraq, and other locations outside the United States. In many instances
128

See Karen Greenberg & Joshua Dratel, eds., The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu
Ghraib (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
129
Brian Ross & Richard Esposito, “CIA’s Harsh Interrogation Techniques Described”
ABC News (November 18, 2005). See also Walter Pincus, “Waterboarding Historically
Controversial” Washington Post, October 5, 2006, at A17. For a discussion of the background to
CIA interrogations in the “war on terror”, see David Johnston, “At a Secret Interrogation, Dispute
Flared Over Tactics” New York Times, September 9, 2006. The CIA director denied in 2007 that any
of the stress techniques employed at “black sites” constituted torture. See Walter Pincus, “CIA
Chief Complains About Agency’s Critics in Europe” Washington Post, April 17, 2007, at A12.
130
Fay-Jones Report (August 2004) in Greenberg & Dratel, Torture Papers, supra, note
128, at 993.
131
See, e.g., Tim Golden, “In U.S. Report, Brutal Details of 2 Afghan Inmates’ Deaths”
New York Times, May 20, 2005; David Johnston, “More of F.B.I. Memo Criticizing Guantánamo
Methods Is Released” New York Times, March 22, 2005 at A-17. See also Seymour Hersh, Chain of
Command: The Road from 9/11 to Abu Ghraib (New York: HarperCollins, 2004).
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the harsh treatment was ordered as part of an approved list of
interrogation methods to “soften up” detainees. … Reported methods
of torture and abuse used against detainees include prolonged
incommunicado detention; disappearances; beatings; death threats;
painful stress positions; sexual humiliation; forced nudity; exposure to
extreme heat and cold; denial of food and water; sensory deprivation
such as hooding and blindfolding; sleep deprivation; water-boarding;
use of dogs to inspire fear; and racial and religious insults. In addition,
around one hundred detainees in U.S. custody in Afghanistan and Iraq
have died. The government has acknowledged that 27 deaths in U.S.
custody were homicide, some caused due to “strangulation,”
“hypothermia,” “asphyxiation,” and “blunt force injuries.” 132

Interrogation techniques employed by other allied states in the
campaign against terrorism have also generated controversy, especially
where detainees are placed in the custody of these nations via
“extraordinary rendition” by the United States or another nation.
Rendition — covert removals without formal extradition or deportation
— is not a new practice in the United States. The procedure was
employed by U.S. officials pre-9/11 to remove expeditiously persons
wanted abroad for suspected involvement in terrorism.133 It is now
conducted on a much vaster scale, and its focus has shifted from
rendition to “justice” to rendition to interrogation (often in circumstances
where torture is likely).134 Estimates made in 2005 suggested that 150
people had been rendered by the United States since September 11,
2001.135 News reports name several states — all of whom have been
accused by the U.S. State Department of employing torture136 — as the
countries to which individuals have been rendered. These nations
132
ACLU, Enduring Abuse: Torture and Cruel Treatment by the United States at Home and
Abroad (April 2006), at 4.
133
Human Rights Watch, Still at Risk: Diplomatic Assurances no Safeguard Against
Torture (April 2005); Committee on International Human Rights of the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York & Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, New York University School of
Law, Torture by Proxy: International and Domestic Law Applicable to “Extraordinary Renditions”
(October 2004).
134
Committee on International Human Rights of the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York & Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, New York University School of Law,
Torture by Proxy, id., at 5.
135
Jane Mayer, “Outsourcing Torture” The New Yorker, February 5, 2005. In 2007, CIA
director Michael Haydon claimed that the number of rendered persons is closer to 100. See Walter
Pincus, “CIA Chief Complains About Agency’s Critics in Europe” Washington Post, April 17,
2007, at A12.
136
See, e.g., U.S. State Department, Human Rights Country Reports (2005) (under the
headings “Morocco”, “Egypt”, “Jordan” and “Syria”).
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include Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Syria.137 These actions have fuelled
particular controversy in Europe138 and, after the Arar matter, in Canada.
U.S. actions have been supported by a well-publicized rethink of
the laws governing torture, proffered by Bush administration lawyers.
In an August 1, 2002 memorandum (since repudiated by the U.S.
government), then U.S. assistant attorney general Jay Bybee confined
the definition of torture to only the most egregious of acts, producing
lasting psychological damage such as post-traumatic stress syndrome or
physical pain of an “intensity akin to that which accompanies serious
physical injury such as death or organ failure”.139 “Because the acts
inflicting torture are extreme”, wrote Bybee, “there is a significant range
of acts that though they might constitute cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment fail to rise to the level of torture.”140 The Bush
administration further urged that international cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment standards did not extend to the treatment by U.S.
personnel of foreign nationals overseas.141 This position has also been
repudiated, this time by Congress in the Detainee Protection Act of
2005.142
Even so, in the United States’ controversial military commission
system, information obtained by harsh methods short of torture may be
admissible, if adjudged reliable and of sufficient probative value and its
admission would be in the interest of justice. For the period prior to the
enactment of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (December 30, 2005),

137

Jane Mayer, supra, note 135.
Indeed, it would appear that European intelligence services at least tacitly assisted in
some renditions. See, e.g., Holger Stark, “Berlin ‘Helped CIA’ With Rendition of German Citizen”
Der Spiegel, January 11, 2007; Craig Whitlock, “German Lawmakers Fault Abduction Probe”
Washington Post, October 4, 2006, at A18; Tracy Wilkinson, “Details Emerge in Italian Abduction”
Los Angeles Times, January 10, 2007.
139
Memo 15 (August 1, 2002) in Karen Greenberg & Joshua Dratel, eds., The Torture
Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2005), at 214-15.
The U.S. government has since distanced itself from this interpretation. See Daniel Levin,
Memorandum for James B. Coney, Deputy Attorney General (December 30, 2005), available online:
<http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/terrorism/dojtorture123004mem.pdf>.
140
Memo 14 (August 1, 2002) in Karen Greenberg & Joshua Dratel, supra, note 139, at
214.
141
Statement of Senator Dianne Feinstein, “Nomination of Alberto Gonzales to be Attorney
General of the United States” 151 Congressional Record 8 (February 1, 2005), reading a letter from
U.S. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales in the follow-up of his Senate confirmation hearings in
which Gonzales asserted squarely that “[t]here is no legal prohibition under the Convention Against
Torture on cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment with respect to aliens overseas.”
142
Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739.
138
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this potentially admissible information includes that obtained through
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.143
(b) Coerced Information as Evidence
(i) Admissibility of Torture Information
In Canada, it is abundantly clear that information generated through
torture is inadmissible in judicial proceedings. First, torture is strictly
prohibited in international law. The International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights144 provides in article 7 that “no one shall be subjected to
torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”.
Under the ICCPR, torture (and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment
and punishment) are among the rights for which no derogation is
permitted, even in times of emergency that threaten the life of the
nation.145 The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment146 replicates this prohibition in
more detailed form.
Further, that same U.N. Torture Convention provides in article 15
that “each State Party shall ensure that any statement which is
established to have been made as a result of torture shall not be invoked
as evidence in any proceedings, except against a person accused of
torture as evidence that the statement was made”. This is a sweeping
prohibition. As the United Kingdom House of Lords ruled in A v.
Secretary of State, the article “cannot possibly be read … as intended to
apply only in criminal proceedings. Nor can it be understood to
differentiate between confessions and accusatory statements, or to apply
only where the state in whose jurisdiction the proceedings are held has
inflicted or been complicit in the torture.”147
For its part, section 7 of the Charter protects against deprivation of
life, liberty and security of the person in violation of “fundamental
justice”. Section 11(d), meanwhile, guarantees those accused of an

143

Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C § 948r.
999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force in 1976 [hereinafter “ICCPR”].
145
ICCPR, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force in 1976, art. 4.
146
A/RES/39/46, annex, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984),
entered into force June 26, 1987 [hereinafter “Torture Convention”].
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A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2005] U.K.H.L. 71, [2006] 2 A.C.
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offence a “fair” trial. In Hape, the Supreme Court signalled clearly that
torture evidence would violate these constitutional standards:
The circumstances in which the evidence was gathered must be
considered in their entirety to determine whether admission of the
evidence would render a Canadian trial unfair. The way in which the
evidence was obtained may make it unreliable, as would be true of
conscriptive evidence, for example. The evidence may have been
gathered through means, such as torture, that are contrary to
fundamental Charter values. Such abusive conduct would taint the
fairness of any trial in which the evidence was admitted. 148

Moreover, use of evidence obtained by torture is expressly
prohibited under Canada’s criminal law. Section 269.1 of the Criminal
Code implements Canada’s obligations under the Torture Convention
and prohibits the use of torture evidence in Canada. This bar should
apply regardless of whether the torture evidence was obtained in Canada
or overseas, an approach adopted in India v. Singh, a decision of the
B.C. Supreme Court applying section 269.1’s evidentiary rule.149
(ii) Information Produced by Techniques Short of Torture
The absolute bar on torture and its use in producing information
deployed in legal proceedings is indisputable. The rules for coercion
short of torture are more complex.
(A) COMMON LAW
In the Canadian law of evidence, coerced information of whatever
sort is generally inadmissible. At common law, for instance, the courts
have developed a “confessions rule” designed to minimize the prospect
of false confessions by seeking to ensure that a confession is
voluntary.150 Interrogation tactics violating this rule will render a
confession inadmissible. Such techniques include “outright violence”151
and “imminent threats of torture”,152 the suggestion of leniency from the
148

R. v. Hape, [2007] S.C.J. No. 26, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 292, at para. 109 (S.C.C.).
[1996] B.C.J. No. 2792, 108 C.C.C. (3d) 274 (B.C.S.C.).
150
See discussion in R. v. Oickle, [2002] S.C.J. No. 38, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3, at para. 47
(S.C.C.) (“The common law confessions rule is well-suited to protect against false confessions.
While its overriding concern is with voluntariness, this concept overlaps with reliability. A
confession that is not voluntary will often (though not always) be unreliable”).
151
Id., at para. 53.
152
Id., at para. 48.
149
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authorities and courts in exchange for an admission,153 or other threats or
inducements of a sort that “raise a reasonable doubt about whether the
will of the subject has been overborne”.154
Oppressive conduct may also violate the common law standard,
including “depriving the suspect of food, clothing, water, sleep, or
medical attention; denying access to counsel; … excessively aggressive,
intimidating questioning for a prolonged period of time” and possibly
use by the police of false evidence to induce a confession.155 Likewise,
police trickery substantial enough to “shock the conscience of the
community” may trigger application of the confessions rule.156
(B) SECURITY CERTIFICATE STANDARD
Notably, however, between 2002 and 2008, the security certificate
regime permitted the judge to “receive into evidence anything that, in the
opinion of the judge, is appropriate, even if it is inadmissible in a court
of law, and may base the decision on that evidence”.157 The net effect of
this provision was to negate common law rules of evidence, potentially
replacing well-understood rules of evidence with the more ambiguous
standing of “appropriate”.
Nevertheless, a suspicion in IRPA proceedings that intelligence was
generated by torture should have triggered consideration of section 269.1
or at least an assessment of reliability. Federal Courts seem to have
adopted the latter approach, declining to give weight to evidence
obtained via torture.158 Less certain is the approach that would be taken
for actions, that while not torture, are also precluded by international
law; specifically, information that is the product of cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment (“CID treatment”).
In its original iteration, Bill C-3 indicated that information could
only be used in security certificate proceedings if “reliable” in addition
to being appropriate. The House of Commons Standing Committee on
Public Safety and National Security opted to amplify whatever
guarantees this language might provide by specifying that reliable
153

Id., at para. 49.
Id., at para. 57.
155
Id., at para. 60.
156
Id., at paras. 65-66.
157
IRPA, supra, note 12, s. 78(j), repealed by S.C. 2008, c. 3.
158
Lai v. Canada (Minister of Citzenship and Immigration), [2005] F.C.J. No. 584, 2005
FCA 125 (F.C.A.); Re Harket, [2005] F.C.J. No. 481, 2005 FC 393 (F.C.); Mahjoub v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2006] F.C.J. No. 1862, 2006 FC 1503 (F.C.).
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information could not include information believed “on reasonable
grounds to have been obtained as a result of the use of torture within the
meaning of section 269.1 of the Criminal Code, or cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment within the meaning of the
Convention Against Torture”.
(C) MEANING OF CID TREATMENT
A key question will now be what CID treatment is “within the
meaning of the Convention Against Torture” — that is, the United
Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and
Degrading Treatment or Punishment.159 That Convention specifies that
… each State Party shall undertake to prevent in any territory under its
jurisdiction other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment which do not amount to torture as defined in article 1,
when such acts are committed by or at the instigation of or with the
consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an
official capacity.160

In practice, CID treatment is commonly viewed as egregious
treatment that falls short of outright torture.161 However, it is not defined
in the Torture Convention, and no clear standard determines how
outrageous this conduct must be to constitute CID treatment. The U.N.
General Assembly has urged that the term be “interpreted so as to extend
the widest possible protection against abuses, whether physical or
mental”.162 For its part, the U.N. Human Rights Committee — the treaty
body established by the ICCPR — has declined to “draw up a list of
prohibited acts or to establish sharp distinctions between the different
kinds of punishment or treatment [barred by Article 7 of the ICCPR]; the
distinctions depend on the nature, purpose and severity of the treatment
159
A/RES/39/46, annex, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984),
entered into force June 26, 1987.
160
Id., art. 16.
161
See, e.g., Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, A/RES/3452, 30 U.N. GAOR,
Supp. No. 34, at 91, art. 1, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975) (“Torture constitutes an aggravated and
deliberate form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”); Restatement (Third) of
Foreign Relations Law of the United States, § 702, Reporters’ Note 5 (1987) (citing Ireland v.
United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. Hum. Rts., ser. A. para. 167 (1978) for the proposition that “[t]he
difference between torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment ‘derives
principally from a difference in the intensity of the suffering inflicted’”).
162
Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, adopted by A/RES/34/169 of December
17, 1979, art. 5, Commentary (c).
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applied”.163 It has further observed that “what constitutes inhuman or
degrading treatment falling within the meaning of Article 7 depends on
all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration and manner of the
treatment, its physical or mental effects as well as the sex, age and state
of health of the victim”.164
In at least one instance, the committee has accepted that the rationale
for the treatment may be relevant in determining its legal character. In a
case against Australia, it held that a state’s legitimate fear of the flight
risk posed by prisoners warranted the shackling of those individuals and
rendered this act something other than CID treatment.165 The committee
has been reluctant, however, to take this line of reasoning too far. It
appears, therefore, to reject state justifications for certain forms of
treatment, including corporal punishment,166 a state action the committee
readily declares to be CID treatment.167 It has also indicated that where
an act does, in fact, constitute CID treatment, no justification exonerates
the injuring state. As noted, there is no derogation from article 7 even in
times of national emergencies, presumably the most potent public
interest motivation imaginable.168
Despite an unwillingness to define ex ante the exact contours of the
CID treatment standard, both the Human Rights Committee and its
counterpart under the Torture Convention — the U.N. Committee
163
UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment 20, Art. 7, U.N. Doc. HRI\GEN\1\Rev.1
(1994), at para. 4.
164
Vuolanne v. Finland, U.N. Human Rights Committee File 265/87.
165
Bertran v. Australia, U.N. Human Rights Committee File 1020/01, at para. 8.2.
166
Osbourne v. Jamaica, U.N. Human Rights Committee File 759/97, at para. 9.1
(“Irrespective of the nature of the crime that is to be punished, however brutal it may be, it is the
firm opinion of the Committee that corporal punishment constitutes cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment or punishment contrary to article 7 of the Covenant”).
167
U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment 20, Art. 7, U.N. Doc. HRI\GEN\
1\Rev.1 (1994), at para. 5.
168
Id., at para. 3:

The text of article 7 allows no limitation. The Committee reaffirms that, even in
situations of public emergency such as those referred to in article 4 of the Covenant, no
derogation from the provision of article 7 is allowed and its provision must remain in
force. The Committee likewise observes that no justification or extenuating
circumstances may be invoked to excuse a violation of article 7 for any reasons,
including those based on an order from a superior officer or public authority.
See also J. Herman Burgers & Hans Danelius, The United Nations Convention Against Torture
(Boston: M. Nijhoff, 1988), at 150 (“Unlike in the definition of torture … the purpose of the act is
irrelevant in determining whether or not the act should be considered to constitute cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment”); Sarah Joseph, Jenny Schultz & Melissa Castan, The International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights: Cases, Materials and Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2004), at 212 et seq.
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Against Torture — have identified specific state practices they view as
constituting CID treatment. For instance, the particular acts declared
CID treatment by the Committee Against Torture include:









substandard detention facilities lacking basic amenities such as
water, electricity and heating in cold temperatures;169
long periods of pre-trial detention and delays in judicial procedure
coupled with incarceration in facilities ill equipped for prolonged
detention;170
beating prisoners who are also denied medical treatment and are
deprived of food and proper places of detention;171
virtual isolation of detainees for a period of a year;172
use of electro-shock belts and restraint chairs as means of
constraint;173
acts of police brutality that may lead to serious injury or death;174 and
deliberate torching of houses.175

Commenting specifically on interrogation techniques, the committee
has also identified the following as CID treatment: “(1) restraining in
very painful conditions, (2) hooding under special conditions, (3)
sounding of loud music for prolonged periods, (4) sleep deprivation for
prolonged periods, (5) threats, including death threats, (6) violent
shaking, and (7) using cold air to chill”.176 The committee’s list is
roughly analogous to similar lists of techniques found to be inhuman and
degrading by the European Court of Human Rights under the European
Convention on Human Rights177 and improper by the Israeli Supreme
Court.178

169

Report of the Committee against Torture, U.N. Doc. A/56/44 (2001), at para. 183.
Id., at para. 119.
171
Report of the Committee Against Torture, U.N. Doc. A/53/44 (1998), at para. 175.
172
Supra, note 169, at paras. 58 and 61.
173
Id., at paras. 179 and 180.
174
Supra, note 171, at para. 64.
175
Dzemajl v. Yugoslavia, U.N. Committee Against Torture File 161/00.
176
Report of the Committee Against Torture, U.N. Doc. A/52/44 (1997), at para. 257.
177
Ireland v. United Kingdom, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B), at 3 (1976) (discussing protracted
standing on the tip of the toes; covering of the head for the duration of the detention; exposure to
loud noise for a prolonged period and deprivation of sleep, food and water).
178
Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Israel, HCJ 5100/94, at para. 29 (Israeli
Supreme Court, 1999) (declaring improper the “Shabach” method, composed of several
components: the cuffing of the suspect, seating him on a low chair, covering his head with a sack,
and playing loud music in the area).
170
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Specific acts identified by the Human Rights Committee as
constituting CID treatment do not differ greatly from those invoked by
the Committee Against Torture. They include abduction of an individual
and then detention without contact with family members;179 denial of
food and water;180 denial of medical assistance after ill-treatment;181 death
threats;182 mock executions;183 whipping and corporal punishment;184
failure to notify a family of the fate of an executed prisoner;185 prolonged
detention on death row when coupled with “further compelling
circumstances relating to the detention”;186 and detention in substandard
facilities187 or conditions.188 Examples of CID treatment stemming from
the conditions of detention include:






incarceration for 50 hours in an overcrowded facility, resulting in
prisoners being soiled with excrement, coupled with denial of food
and water for a day;189
incarceration in circumstances falling below the standards set in the
U.N. Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners,190
coupled with detention incommunicado, death and torture threats,
deprivation of food and water and denial of recreational relief;191
solitary incarceration for 10 years in a tiny cell, with minimal
recreational opportunities;192

179
N’Goya v. Zaire, U.N. Human Rights Committee File 542/1993, at para. 5.6; Basilio
Laureano Atachahua v. Peru, U.N. Human Rights Committee File 540/1993, at para. 8.5.
180
Miha v. Equatorial Guinea, U.N. Human Rights Committee File 414/1990, at para. 6.4.
181
Id. See also Bailey v. Jamaica, U.N. Human Rights Committee File 334/1988, at para.
9.3.
182
Hylton v. Jamaica, U.N. Human Rights Committee File 407/1990, at para. 9.3.
183
Linton v. Jamaica, U.N. Human Rights Committee File 255/1987, at para. 8.5.
184
Higginson v. Jamaica, U.N. Human Rights Committee File 792/1998, at para. 4.6;
Sooklal v. Trinidad and Tobago, U.N. Human Rights Committee File 928/2000, at para. 4.6.
185
Schedko v. Belarus, U.N. Human Rights Committee File 886/1999, at para. 10.2.
186
Bickaroo v. Trinidad and Tobago, U.N. Human Rights Committee File 553/1993, at
para. 5.6.
187
Adams v. Jamaica, U.N. Human Rights Committee File 607/1994, (views of October 30,
1996).
188
Deidrick v. Jamaica, U.N. Human Rights Committee File 619/1995, at para. 9.3.
189
Protorreal v. Dominican Republic, U.N. Human Rights Committee File 188/1984, at
paras. 9.2 and 11.
190
Adopted by the First United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the
Treatment of Offenders, held at Geneva in 1955, and approved by the Economic and Social Council
by its resolution 663 C (XXIV) of July 31, 1957 and 2076 (LXII) of May 13, 1977.
191
Mukong v. Cameroon, U.N. Human Rights Committee File 458/1991, at paras. 9.3 and
9.4.
192
Edwards v. Jamaica, U.N. Human Rights Committee File 529/1993, at para. 8.3.
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solitary incarceration incommunicado for various periods;193 and
incarceration with limited recreational opportunities, no mattress or
bedding, no adequate sanitation, ventilation or electric lighting, and
denial of exercise, medical treatment, nutrition and clean drinking
water.194

(iii) Reasonable Grounds Standard
If the description of interrogation techniques used by the United
States and other countries discussed above is any indication, a
substantial amount of information stemming from these sources should
be excluded from security certificate proceedings on the basis, at the
very least, of the CID treatment standard. There need not be any debate,
for example, as to whether waterboarding is torture, a bizarre
controversy that has arisen in the United States recently. Even if it is not,
it is certainly CID treatment.
In the past, an issue has arisen as to which party bears the burden of
proof in demonstrating the methods via which the information was
produced.195 The onus and burden of proof issue is simplified in the Bill
C-3 context by two variables. First, unlike in other cases in which named
persons not privy to the information used against then are asked to make
the case that that information is the product of coercive interrogation, the
special advocate in security certificate cases will (hopefully) be in a
reasonable position to query and challenge the provenance of
information deployed by the government. In this circumstance, asking
the special advocate to bear the onus may not be unusually onerous. This
conclusion does not, of course, apply where the special advocate is given
access to only the most processed information, the provenance of which
is unclear. In these circumstances, courts should be very demanding of
the government and insist that information on the source of the data be
provided.
Second, the threshold of proof articulated in Bill C-3 is belief on
reasonable grounds. Almost identical language appears elsewhere in the
193
Campos v. Peru, U.N. Human Rights Committee File 577/1994, at para. 8.7 (detention
incommunicado for one year); Shaw v. Jamaica, U.N. Human Rights Committee File 704/1996, at
para. 7.1 (detention incommunicado for eight months in overcrowded and damp conditions).
194
Brown v. Jamaica, U.N. Human Rights Committee File 775/1997, at para. 6.13.
195
See, e.g., the discussion on onus of proof in torture information cases in A v. Secretary of
State of the Home Department, [2005] U.K.H.L. 71, [2006] 2 A.C. 221 (U.K.H.L.) and India v.
Singh, [1996] B.C.J. No. 2792, 108 C.C.C. (3d) 274 (B.C.S.C.).
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IRPA, not least in the provisions discussed further below allowing a
named person to be detained on “reasonable grounds to believe” that
they are a security risk. This same language was part of the IRPA under
the pre-Bill C-3 regime for security certificate detentions, as well as
many other immigration-related matters. Assessing its meaning in
Charkaoui, the Supreme Court has concluded that such a belief depends
on whether “there is an objective basis [that the person is a danger] …
which is based on compelling and credible information”.196 It has
repeated this observation in relation to other IRPA provisions using the
same language.197 Notably, this is a standard that falls short of the civil
balance of probabilities standard.198
Since reasonable grounds to believe is prescribed in relation to the
exclusion of torture and CID treatment information, the only plausible
interpretation is that, to make out grounds for excluding this information,
the named person or the special advocate will have to justify their case
on an objective basis, based on compelling and credible information.
They will not, however, be obliged to prove their case on a balance of
probabilities, creating a potentially expansive scope for exclusions.
2. Missed Opportunities
While the inclusion of CID treatment language can be regarded as an
improvement, Bill C-3 failed to address other concerns. First, Bill C-3
persists in applying stricter controls on disclosure to named persons than
would be applied in other Canadian judicial proceedings. Second, Bill C-3
did not cure provisions in the IRPA that allow the government to remove
named persons to torture. Third, Bill C-3 reinforced the likelihood that
security certificates will evolve into a system of indefinite constraints on
liberty for foreigners more stringent than anything applicable to Canadian
citizens.

196
Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2007] S.C.J. No. 9, [2007] 1
S.C.R. 350, at para. 39 (S.C.C.).
197
See, e.g., Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Mugesera, [2005] S.C.J.
No. 39, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 100, at para. 114 (S.C.C.).
198
Id. “[T]he ‘reasonable grounds to believe’ standard requires something more than mere
suspicion, but less than the standard applicable in civil matters of proof on the balance of
probabilities”).
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(a) Disclosure to the Named Person
In Charkaoui, the Supreme Court clearly concluded that the
limitations on disclosure to the named person violated section 7 of the
Charter. Special advocates might save the procedure under section 1, but
there should be no misapprehension that they restore a fair hearing — as
noted, their capacity to rebut government cases can never be as full as
would counsel fully able to discuss the government’s complete case with
their client. Accordingly, a core priority will continue to be the fullest
possible disclosure of information to the named person. On this issue,
Bill C-3 falls short of standards developed in Canadian law in other
contexts and what may be the emerging practice in the United Kingdom.
The IRPA now provides that throughout the security certificate
proceeding, “the judge shall ensure that the permanent resident or
foreign national is provided with a summary of information and other
evidence that enables them to be reasonably informed of the case made
by the Minister in the proceeding but that does not include anything that,
in the judge’s opinion, would be injurious to national security or
endanger the safety of any person if disclosed”.199
This disclosure regime under the immigration law is quite different
from the more general system for protecting national security
confidentiality created by section 38 of the Canada Evidence Act.200 In
the Canada Evidence Act, the judge is able to balance the national
security interest against other interests, including the public interest in a
fair proceeding. Put another way, if the national security implications of
releasing the information is outweighed by the fair hearing interest, the
judge may order disclosure.
This balancing approach may well be adopted in the United
Kingdom in the wake of the House of Lords’ recent decision of
Secretary of State v. MB.201 In that decision, the House of Lords
examined the compatibility of the U.K. system of “control orders” —
limitations on liberty imposed on the basis that a person is suspected of
posing a terrorist threat — with the European Convention on Human
Rights. Control orders proceedings include the use of secret evidence
and special advocates. While generally comfortable with the special
advocate approach to reconciling bona fide needs for secrecy with
199
200
201

IRPA, s. 83(1)(e).
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5, s. 38.
[2007] U.K.H.L. 46, [2008] 1 All E.R. 657 (U.K.H.L.).
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fairness, the House of Lords noted that there were limits on the extent
that special advocates could resuscitate fair trial rights. Although
somewhat less than emphatic on this point, the law lords reasoning
suggests that a residual discretion should rest with the judge to determine
whether the level of disclosure to the named person was sufficient to
meet fair trial standards. Where the proceeding falls short of a fair
hearing, the matter might come to an end, unless the government is
prepared to make fuller disclosure.
Bill C-3 might usefully have incorporated this balancing approach.
This balancing would allow the judge to permit disclosure if the damage
to the national security from disclosure was relatively small but the
importance of the disclosure of the evidence to the fairness of the
proceeding was very high.
(b) Indefinite Detention or Other Limits on Liberty
Even a special advocate and disclosure model that met all of the
objections and addressed all the concerns set out above would not cure
certain fundamental difficulties with the present IRPA system. The
IRPA permits deprivations of liberty on a standard slightly more
demanding than suspicion. As noted, the information offered by the
government in support of the reasonableness of a security certificate is
assessed on the basis of a “reasonable ground to believe” standard, a
threshold much lower than the accepted criminal or civil law standards
of proof. Further, a person may be removed to face persecution where
the government considers the security risk presented by that person so
justifies, and these decisions are reviewed by courts applying highly
deferential standards of review.202
Taken together, this regime imposes relatively undemanding burdens
on a government committed to restricting liberty for prolonged — and
potentially indefinite — periods, pending deportation which may result

202
See, e.g., Mahjoub v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2005] F.C.J.
No. 173, 2005 FC 156, at para. 42 (F.C.)

[T]he Court must adopt a deferential approach to these questions, and intervene to set
aside the delegate’s decision only if patently unreasonable. This means that, in order for
the Court to intervene, it must be satisfied that the decision was made arbitrarily, or in
bad faith, or without regard to the appropriate factors, or the decision cannot be
supported on the evidence. The Court is not to re-weigh the factors considered or
interfere simply because the Court would have reached a different conclusion.
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in torture or maltreatment far in excess of anything that could be
imposed under Canadian law.
In this respect, Bill C-3 does nothing to change the prior security
certificate regime. It does, however, add structure to what may become a
system of indefinite detention (or other, significant constraints on
liberty) for foreign nationals. This last section examines this contention,
looking first at the question of removal to torture and then detention.
(i) Removal to Torture
Canada appears to be unique among Western states in anticipating in
its statute books removal to torture if the security threats are significant
enough. Under the security certificate process, where the judge views the
certificate as reasonable, the judge’s decision constitutes a removal
order.203 However, this process may be complemented (for non-refugees)
with a “pre-removal risk assessment process”. Specifically, the Act
provides that non-refugees subject to a security certificate may be
protected from removal if the risk of torture or cruel and unusual
treatment is more significant, in the eyes of the government, than the
danger that person presents to the security of Canada.204 A similar
protection is available to refugees subject to security certificates.
Pursuant to section 115 of the Act, a refugee may be removed even
where they are at risk of torture where the person constitutes a danger to
the security of Canada. However, the security risk must be properly
balanced against the risk of maltreatment.205
As these provisions suggest, the risk of torture is not an absolute bar
on removal, but instead a limitation on deportations that can be
overcome in the interest of national security.
Canada’s preparedness to remove persons to torture has generated
negative international commentary.206 It is also unquestionably contrary
203
204
205

IRPA, s. 80.
Id., s. 112 et seq., particularly s. 113(d).
See Mahjoub v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), supra, note 202, at

para. 56.
206

In its 2005 assessment of Canada’s compliance with the Torture Convention,
A/RES/39/46, annex, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51), at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984), entered
into force June 26, 1987, the U.N. Committee Against Torture expressed concern at the “failure of
the Supreme Court of Canada, in Suresh v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, to recognize at
the level of domestic law the absolute nature of the protection of article 3 of the Convention, which
is not subject to any exception whatsoever” and recommended that Canada “unconditionally
undertake to respect the absolute nature of article 3 in all circumstances and fully to incorporate the
provision of article 3 into the State party’s domestic law”. Conclusions and Recommendations of the
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to international law. Certainly, a terrorist is not entitled to refugee status
under international refugee law.207 Like every other person, however,
such an individual may not be expelled, returned (“refouler”) or
extradited “to another State where there are substantial grounds for
believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture”.208 In
assessing these substantial grounds, governments are to “take into
account all relevant considerations including, where applicable, the
existence in the State concerned of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant
or mass violations of human rights”.209
These obligations — contained in the U.N. Torture Convention —
exist also by virtue of the ICCPR. As noted, that instrument bars torture
and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment.210 The
U.N. Human Rights Committee has interpreted this prohibition to apply
to deportation proceedings: “States parties must not expose individuals
to the danger of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment upon return to another country by way of their extradition,
expulsion or refoulement.”211
Where substantial grounds to believe torture will occur exist, the bar
on removal to torture is absolute and is subject to no derogation.
However, states — including Canada — have sometimes sought to
justify removals to countries with notorious torture records on the
grounds that the prospect of torture is vitiated by “diplomatic
assurances”; that is, pledges provided by states that they will not torture
the individual. These assurances — intended to guard against an
eventuality that is almost always illegal in these states, and yet occurs on
a sometimes vast scale — have been roundly condemned by human

Committee against Torture: Canada (07/07/2005) CAT/C/CR/34/CAN, online: <www.unhchr.ch/
tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/CAT.C.CR.34.CAN.En?Opendocument>.
207
United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 (1951),
art. 1(F) (the refugee convention does not apply to a person if there is serious reason to consider that
he or she has “been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations”).
See IRPA, s. 96, Sch., incorporating this rule. The Supreme Court of Canada has concluded
(reasonably) that terrorism constitutes such an act. Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of
Immigration and Citizenship), [1998] S.C.J. No. 46, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982, at paras. 66 and 120
(S.C.C.).
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Torture Convention, A/RES/39/46, annex, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51), at 197, U.N.
Doc. A/39/51 (1984), entered into force June 26, 1987, art. 3.
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ICCPR, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force in 1976, art. 7.
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rights organizations as ineffective.212 The Supreme Court of Canada has
also queried their utility in Suresh.213
In Suresh, however, the Supreme Court created substantial
uncertainty as to whether Canada’s international obligations under the
Torture Convention and the ICCPR were also part of Canadian
constitutional law. In that case, the Supreme Court applied section 7 of
the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and held that “insofar as the
Immigration Act leaves open the possibility of deportation to torture,
the Minister should generally decline to deport refugees where on the
evidence there is a substantial risk of torture”.214 However, the Court
qualified its holding by refusing to “exclude the possibility that in
exceptional circumstances, deportation to face torture might be justified,
either as a consequence of the balancing process mandated by s. 7 of the
Charter or under s. 1” in exceptional conditions “such as natural
disasters, the outbreak of war, epidemics and the like”.215 Exactly what
constitutes these exceptional circumstances remained unclear at the time
of this writing.216
Unquestionably, however, the “exceptional circumstances” language
employed by the Supreme Court in Suresh is a fragile basis on which to
212
See, for example, Human Rights Watch, Still at Risk: Diplomatic Assurances No
Safeguard Against Torture (April 2005), online: <http://hrw.org/reports/2005/eca0405/>; Human
Rights Watch, Empty Promises: Diplomatic Assurances No Safeguard Against Torture (April 2004),
online: <http://hrw.org/reports/2004/un0404/>.
213
Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] S.C.J. No. 3, [2002]
1 S.C.R. 3, at para. 124 (S.C.C.) (“We would signal the difficulty in relying too heavily on
assurances by a state that it will refrain from torture in the future when it has engaged in illegal
torture or allowed others to do so on its territory in the past. This difficulty becomes acute in cases
where torture is inflicted not only with the collusion but through the impotence of the state in
controlling the behaviour of its officials”). The use of assurances in the United Kingdom has also
been controversial. There, the government has had mixed success in using assurances to justify
removal to torturing regimes. See discussion in Duncan Hooper, “Court Deals Major Blow to Antiterror Strategy” [London] Daily Telegraph, April 28, 2007.
214
Suresh, id., at para. 77.
215
Id., at para. 78.
216
Lower courts, however, have moved to limit the reach of this Suresh language. In Re
Jaballah, [2006] F.C.J. No. 1706, 2006 FC 1230 (F.C.), the Federal Court considered whether the
security-certificate detainee in that case could be removed to face substantial risk of torture
overseas. While accepting that Jaballah constituted a risk to national security, as claimed by the
government, the court did not view his case as the “exceptional” circumstance contemplated by
Suresh, pointing to the fact that he had not been “personally involved in violence”. Id., at para. 82.
The court did not outright bar deportation. Jaballah could still be removed to some third country
where he would not be tortured. A willing host of this sort may, however, be uncommon in cases
where the person constitutes a bona fide security risk. All told, therefore, the constitutional ruling in
Jaballah, if followed in practice under the new security certificate regime, may effectively bar a
detainee’s removal.
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build Canada’s national security deportation law. Deportation to torture
will also certainly be revisited by the Supreme Court in the foreseeable
future. Indeed, recent jurisprudence from the Supreme Court has stressed
that, in interpreting the Charter, “courts should seek to ensure
compliance with Canada’s binding obligations under international law
where the express words are capable of supporting such a
construction”.217 Since the words of the Charter are more than capable of
being read consistently with the Torture Convention, it seems unlikely
the Suresh exception can survive close application of this interpretive
rule.
The senate special committee on anti-terrorism law recommended in
2007 that the IRPA be amended to bar emphatically removal where there
are “reasonable grounds to believe the individual will be subject to
torture in the country to which he or she will be removed”.218 Bill C-3
failed to do this, leaving intact a Canadian statute book that cannot be
reconciled with Canada’s international obligations.
(ii) Detention or Other Limitations on Liberty
(A) DETENTION SYSTEM UNDER SECURITY CERTIFICATES
Once the ministers issue a security certificate, named persons may
be held in detention on national security grounds pursuant to a warrant.219
The ministers may issue this warrant where they have “reasonable
grounds to believe that the permanent resident is a danger to national
security”, among other things.220 The detention of a named person is
reviewed by a special designated judge of the Federal Court within 48
hours. In this review, the court will order that the detention be continued
if the judge is “satisfied” that the named person’s release (on conditions,
in the new law) would, among other things, be injurious to national
security.221 If the judge is so satisfied, the matter is revisited every six
months. The reference to “satisfied” could be construed as obliging
fairly searching judicial consideration of the detention order. However,
217
R. v. Hape, [2007] S.C.J. No. 26, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 292, at para. 56 (S.C.C.); Canada
(Justice) v. Khadr, [2008] S.C.J. No. 28, 2008 SCC 28, at para. 18 (S.C.C.). See also Health
Services and Support-Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia, [2007] S.C.J. No.
27, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 391, at para. 79.
218
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because the original ministerial detention warrant is based on a
“reasonable grounds the belief” the Supreme Court has concluded that
court reviews of the detention should also be based on this standard; that
is, a judge is to consider whether “there is an objective basis [that the
person is a danger] … which is based on compelling and credible
information”.222
In practice, this detention can be prolonged. In part because
individuals have resisted deportation to states that may torture them, the
men subject to security certificates at the time of this writing spent (or
continue to spend) lengthy periods incarcerated: by the beginning of
2007, the average period of detention for the men still imprisoned at that
time was almost six years.223 This is a period of detention longer than the
average sentence for convicted attempted murderers in Canada.224
(B) CONDITIONAL RELEASE
In the years before Bill C-3, the Federal Court demonstrated an
unease (expressed in practice, if not in prose) with prolonged securitycertificate detention. For instance, in Charkaoui, the Federal Court judge
acknowledged that factual circumstances change with the passage of
time, influencing how the court would assess the need for continued
detention. In that case, the prolonged period of detention, coupled with
the notoriety of the case, “neutralized” the security threat, prompting the
judge to order Charkaoui’s release on conditions, pending the outcome
of the removal proceedings.225 Similarly, a second detainee, Mohamed
Harkat, was released by the Federal Court, on strict conditions in 2006.226
Two other men, Mohammad Mahjoub and Mahmoud Jaballah, were
released in similar circumstances in early 2007.227
222
Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2007] S.C.J. No. 9, [2007] 1
S.C.R. 350, at para. 39 (S.C.C.).
223
This figure was calculated in relation to the three men still detained as of January 2007.
As this book was completed, two men (Mahjoub and Jaballah) were released on conditions, pending
the resolution of their cases. There were, therefore, four men subject to security certificates, but
released on conditions, and one other still detained.
224
See Statistics Canada, Sentenced Cases and Outcomes in Adult Criminal Court, by
Province and Yukon Territory (Canada) (2003 data), online: <www40.statcan.ca/l01/cst01/
legal21a.htm>.
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Re Charkaoui, [2005] F.C.J. No. 269, 2005 FC 248 (F.C.).
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Harkat v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2006] F.C.J. No. 770,
2006 FC 628 (F.C.), affd [2006] F.C.J. No. 934, 2006 FCA 259 (F.C.A.).
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[2007] F.C.J. No. 518, 2007 FC 379 (F.C.).
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This practice of judicial release on strict conditions was endorsed by
the Supreme Court in Charkaoui, and indeed was the feature of the
security certificate system that preserved it from being declared cruel
and unusual treatment in violation of the Charter.228 The Court concluded
that “extended periods of detention under the certificate provisions of the
IRPA do not violate ss. 7 and 12 of the Charter if accompanied by a
process that provides regular opportunities for review of detention,
taking into account all relevant factors” including: reasons for the
detention; length of the detention; reasons for the delay of deportation;
anticipated future length of detention; and the availability of alternatives
to detention.229
It must be recognized, however, that the conditions that have been
imposed to secure release are very aggressive. For example, the order to
which Harkat was subjected upon conditional release required that he
not have access to a room with an Internet-equipped computer. Violation
of this or any other condition was, according to the release agreement,
“an offence within the meaning of section 127 of the Criminal Code and
shall constitute an offence pursuant to paragraph 124(1)(a) of the
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act”.230
While perhaps justifiable in their own right, it is notable that strict
release conditions allow the state to impose a different code of conduct
on suspected security risks than exists under the regular law. Where
these closely monitored persons violate the terms of release, the latter
may amount to a hair-trigger converting immigration detention into
incarceration for criminal offences.
(C) BILL C-3 AND INDEFINITE LIMITATIONS ON LIBERTY FOR
FOREIGNERS
Bill C-3 codifies, without truly altering, prior practice on detention
and conditional release. It formalizes a graduated form of constraints on
228
Charkaoui, supra, note 222, at paras. 98 (“I conclude that the IRPA does not impose
cruel and unusual treatment within the meaning of s. 12 of the Charter because, although detentions
may be lengthy, the IRPA, properly interpreted, provides a process for reviewing detention and
obtaining release and for reviewing and amending conditions of release, where appropriate”) and
107.
229
Id., at para. 110 et seq.
230
Section 127 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, creates an indictable offence
liable to imprisonment for up to two years for disobeying an order of a court. Section 124 of the
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 creates an offence (punishable in s. 125
on indictment with up to two years’ imprisonment) for failing to comply with a condition or
obligation imposed under the IRPA.
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liberty: detention is to be continued only if a judge is satisfied that
conditional release does not adequately protect, inter alia, national
security.231 It also creates formal statutory authority for conditional
release, authorizes a court to adjust those release orders in various
circumstances (including “because of a material change in the
circumstances that led to the order”)232 and allows a named person to be
arrested by a peace officer where the latter has reasonable grounds to
believe the release order has been breached.233
ABSENCE OF A “BURDEN ESCALATOR”
The law does not, however, query whether prolonged limitations on
liberty truly are acceptable on the reasonable grounds to believe
standard. In the view of these authors, a “reasonable ground to believe”
standard of proof may be proper for an initial detention. However, as the
duration of detention or other limits on liberty increase, the government
should bear an escalating burden. Escalating burdens will have the effect
of obliging fuller government disclosure — it must show more to make
out its case. It would also not prejudice the government’s ability to
respond quickly since an initial security certificate could be issued or a
detention ordered on the lesser standard. Only as the detention endured
would the burden on the government escalate.
TOWARDS A SYSTEM OF LIMITATIONS ON LIBERTY FOR FOREIGNERS
Moreover, the law is entirely silent on whether detention or other
constraints on liberty may persist under this regime if the detainee is no
longer subject to viable removal proceedings. This is an important
omission. It may well be that a named person will not be removed
because, on the balancing mandated by the IRPA described above, the
persecution threat (including of torture) to the person if removed
outweighs the threat to national security posed by the person or because
section 7 of the Charter bars their removal to persecution and/or torture.
During the legislative process, the government suggested that the
absence of an existing deportation process will be a variable the Federal
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Court considers in deciding whether to continue a detention or not.234
While that seems likely, nothing in the law brings to an end detention or
other constraints on liberty under the security certificate process where
deportations fail. The letter of the law suggests that this detention or
highly constrained release could continue indefinitely if there remain
reasonable grounds to believe that the person is a danger to national
security.
There are two possible responses to this prospect. First, the Federal
Court (or on appeal, a higher court) might conclude that while there is no
firm link in the law between detention and a viable removal process, the
absence of such removal proceedings is the sort of “material change in
circumstance” that justifies a modification (and relaxation) of the release
order. The difficulty with this approach is that modification does not
mean elimination — the security certificate process anticipates either
detention or conditional release, not full release.
Second, the courts may simply adjudge unconstitutional a system
that allows for the stand-alone detention or limited release of foreigners
on the basis of mere reasonable beliefs, demonstrated by mostly secret
evidence. Detention or limited release pending removal is one thing;
indefinite detention unconnected to removals, even if housed under the
immigration law, would be quite another.
One matter likely to be raised in such a constitutional challenge is
the equality guarantees of section 15 of the Charter. In Charkaoui, the
Supreme Court gave short shrift to equality-based objections to the
security certificate system, largely because “the detentions at issue have
become unhinged from the state’s purpose of deportation”.235 If that dehinging were, however, to arise, the section 15 equality guarantee issues
would be ripe for consideration.
On that issue, unquestionably, the system of detention or limited
release under security certificates is far more draconian than anything
that might be imposed on Canadian citizens. In relation to the latter, the
closest analogy would be recognizance on conditions provisions in the
Criminal Code.236
Under section 810.01, for instance, a person “who fears on
reasonable grounds that another person will commit … a terrorism
234
Mr. Daniel Therrien (Acting Assistant Deputy Attorney General, Citizenship,
Immigration and Public Safety Portfolio, Department of Justice), Evidence, 39th Parl., 2nd Sess.,
Tuesday, November 27, 2007.
235
Charkaoui, supra, note 222, at para. 131.
236
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offence may, with the consent of the Attorney General, lay an
information before a provincial court judge”. If the provincial court
judge is persuaded that these reasonable grounds for the fear exist, he or
she may order the defendant to “enter into a recognizance to keep the
peace and be of good behaviour” for up to 12 months, and may impose
other reasonable conditions. A refusal by the accused to enter into the
recognizance is punishable by imprisonment for up to 12 months. A
breach of a recognizance is a criminal offence, punishable by up to two
years imprisonment if a conviction is secured on indictment.237
These recognizances — or “peace bonds” — differ from the IRPA
process in two key respects, however. First, while the limitations on
liberty under peace bonds could be extensive, they cannot be as
extensive as those under the IRPA. In R. v. Budreo,238 the Ontario Court
of Appeal agreed that a peace bond (in that case, one guarding against
sex offences directed at minors) amounts to a restraint on liberty, and
thus triggered the application of section 7 of the Charter. It concluded,
however, that fundamental justice was not offended where the provision
was largely geared to bona fide prevention and was not truly penal in
nature. Part of that reasoning appears to rest on the fact that the peace
bond was reasonably narrowly tailored, restricting the defendant’s
liberty in respect to a large, but reasonably discrete group of persons
(minors).239 In rejecting the defendant’s supplemental argument that the
constraints imposed by peace bond were overbroad, the court noted the
reasonably narrow scope of the restrictions, underscoring that their
limited focus permitted “a defendant to lead a reasonably normal life”.240
It is also notable that the Budreo court suggested a definite outer limit on
the scope of a peace bond: “detention or imprisonment under a provision
that does not charge an offence would be an unacceptable restriction on a
defendant’s liberty and would be contrary to the principles of
fundamental justice”.241 This language suggests that, at the very least, no
Canadian could be detained for any serious length of time on national
security suspicions.
Second, unlike the IRPA process, peace bond questions are
adjudicated in open court — there is no specific provision that would
237
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allow the use of secret evidence, and any effort to withhold relevant
information from the named person would presumably be considered
under the Canada Evidence Act balancing test discussed above.242 That
same Act empowers the criminal court judge to dismiss proceedings in
circumstances where the government succeeds in denying a person
access to information necessary for a fair trial.243 Put another way, the
procedural guarantees in the criminal context are more robust that those
that are afforded foreigners under the IRPA.
Under these circumstances, an equality challenge to the security
certificate regime seems plausible — perhaps even incontrovertible.
THE SLIPPERY SLOPE
If our courts were to arrive at this conclusion, we would find
ourselves where the United Kingdom was in 2004. In December 2004
the House of Lords declared indefinite detention of foreign terrorist
suspects without trial under immigration law contrary to U.K. human
rights obligations.244 In the words of Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead,
“indefinite imprisonment without charge or trial is anathema in any
country which observes the rule of law”.245 The decision turned, in part,
on the law lords’ conclusion that there was no reason to presume that
foreign nationals (as opposed to U.K. nationals) presented the greatest
national security threat.
In response to this decision, the U.K. Parliament enacted the
Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 permitting the imposition of “control
orders” directed at the activities of both foreign and U.K. nationals
suspected of terrorist activity.246 As noted above, these control orders
permit stringent limitations on liberty, on the basis of secret information.
Bill C-3, by failing to address the prospects of indefinite detention
frankly, potentially creates a slide towards the U.K. outcome, in slow
motion. A preferable course of action would have placed a clear outer
limit on limitations on liberty under the IRPA; a point where, with no
reasonable prospect of deportation, the fate of the named person must be
adjudicated under the standard Criminal Code process, if at all.
242
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VI. CONCLUSION
When these authors spoke to over a dozen United Kingdom (and
New Zealand) special advocates in the summer of 2007, some of these
experienced barristers expressed the hope that the anticipated Canadian
response to Charkaoui would come in the form of a robust special
counsel model that would overcome the problems experienced in their
jurisdictions. As one put it, a Canadian “Cadillac” model would increase
pressure on their own governments to improve their systems.
In fact, Parliament could have enacted a system that affirmatively
permitted carefully controlled continued dialogue between special
advocate and named person, affirmed and guaranteed full disclosure of
all relevant information to the court and special advocate, limited
detention or other constraints on liberty to periods in which deportation
was a possibility, and closed the door on removal to torture, among other
things. All of these proposals were before Parliament and parliamentary
committees, even before Bill C-3 was tabled. Indeed, several had been
endorsed by parliamentary committees in their just-concluded reviews of
Canada’s anti-terrorism laws.
Unfortunately, Bill C-3 charted a very different course, abandoning
features of Canada’s indigenous SIRC system that side-stepped
problems experienced in other jurisdictions and importing, almost holus
bolus, the U.K. approach. There was no advance consultation by
government on this approach, despite acute interest in security
certificates. The bill was tabled in the tenth, if not eleventh, hour before
the expiry of the Charkaoui deadline. It wallowed for weeks in the
Commons, and was rammed through a (properly) unhappy Senate. The
political atmosphere was tainted with hallway mutterings of confidence
votes and finger-pointing if persons characterized by the government as
dangerous terrorists were left free to roam the country.
Bill C-3 has skated as close as it could to the constitutional line
drawn by the Supreme Court. It will now incite another round of
constitutional litigation asking the Court to define exactly where that line
is. At the same time, Bill C-3 makes no effort to forestall inevitable
supplemental constitutional issues surrounding detention and removal to
torture. Constitutional “dialogue” will take the form of an inter-branch
ping-pong.
This back and forth may be characterized as healthy democratic
evolution; a constitutional chat that looks grand from the court room,
class room or parliamentary chamber. It is certainly less attractive to the
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five individuals currently in long-term detention or subject to extremely
strict limitations on liberty, each of whom is facing removal to possible
torture. For these people, as for others involved in the process, Bill C-3
was a trip to Bismarck’s sausage factory.

